

***Report of Survey Results  
on Life and Education Environment  
of Children and Youths  
in Jerusalem Governorate, Palestine***

**December 2012**

***Kokkyo naki Kodomotachi (KnK) in Palestine***

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## **Preface**

Kokkyo naki Kodomotachi (hereinafter KnK Japan), or Children without Borders, was established in September 1997 by Médecins Sans Frontières Japon (MSF-J), or Doctors without Borders, to manage its educational program for children and youths. It became an independent nonprofit organization in November 2000. Since then KnK Japan has been conducting, under the motto of “Growing Together,” both educational activities and support projects for underprivileged children and youths in Asia including Japan.

Underlying KnK Japan’s various activities are the precepts stipulated in the Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1989 – namely, the importance of protecting basic rights for all children in the world to receive education, to enjoy leisure, to embrace future dreams, and to establish themselves. KnK Japan has been supporting children and youths who are living under the severest of living conditions among underprivileged youths as well as those in their late teens who rarely receive support from anyone. These are some of the distinct features of KnK Japan’s activities.

In recent years, the association has devoted itself to emergency humanitarian assistance. On the occasion of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in 2004, KnK Japan started providing assistance in the areas of education and child protection after the occurrence of a large scale natural disaster. Since then, the association has supported children and youths affected by such natural disasters in Indonesia (Northern Sumatra and Central Java), India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar (or Burma), not to mention Japan for those affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011.

In addition, the association has been involved in educational assistance for children and youths in conflict areas. Following a new project initiated in Jordan in 2007, KnK Japan established its office in Palestine (hereinafter KnK in Palestine) in November 2011 and launched a new project entitled “Community-based Project for Promoting Sound Development of Youths in Jerusalem Governorate, West Bank” with the financial support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MoFA). The association operates “House of Hope,” a youth center in the village of Al-Azaria in Jerusalem Governorate in partnership with Vision Association for Culture & Arts (VACA), a local non-governmental organization. The project principally aims to accelerate the sound development of youths, especially those underprivileged in Al-Azaria and two adjacent villages, Abu Dis, and Al-Sawahra, through vocational training (e.g. computer and secretary skills), non-formal education (e.g. tutoring in English, Arabic and natural sciences, music, painting, handcraft, nail arts), and community empowerment (e.g. workshops for young mothers and women’s group). Its main targets include about 1,500 children and youths between 6 and 22

years of age and 500 participants in various activities from the local community as direct beneficiaries, as well as 3,000 people from the local government, young beneficiaries' parents, and the locals as indirect beneficiaries.

KnK in Palestine implemented this research for the purpose of better understanding the living and educational environment surrounding children and youths, especially in project areas, and with the vision to utilize survey results to improve the quality of the project by redesigning it after the end of the first year. Another important objective of this research is to draw attention from the public, including in Palestine and Japan, about the current situations of Palestinian children and youths.

Field surveys were implemented for 4 months from February to May 2012. The main survey targets are households with children and youths at the age of 22 years and below in the three villages. There are quite a few beneficiaries at the age of 5 and below who come to the youth center with older siblings on a regular basis, although the focus was on those between 6 and 22 years of age as the main target age range. Our survey team visited a total of more than 300 households and collected various types of data on living standards, educational environment, life after education, influence derived from socio-political situation, etc.

The remaining part of this research report is outlined as follows. Chapter 1 describes the historical background of Palestine including the political and socio-economic conditions, focusing on general conditions of children and youths, women's situations and the status of refugees, as well as general situations and characteristics of the target three villages and influences over them derived by the Oslo Accords. Chapter 2 explains the framework of the research including research designs and methodology and introduces some demographic data of the target three villages. Chapter 3 presents results of the survey including new findings and statistical data on living standards of children and their families as well as education environment surrounding children, and analysis and interpretation of those statistical data. Chapter 4 discusses peculiarities unique to the target areas through interpretation of data from the survey, describes future projection of target villages, and draws lessons for KnK's project. The authors of each chapter (see later) take full responsibility for the wording and content of the chapter.

This research report was only made possible with the financial support from MoFA for the project, as well as close cooperation of Al-Quds (Jerusalem) University in Abu Dis, Palestine. A team of 6 students ardently devoted themselves to conducting surveys on the ground as field researchers, directly supervised by a faculty staff member as Researcher of KnK in Palestine. Our deepest gratitude also goes to VACA, our local partner organization and its staff for their efforts to facilitate the arrangements of the field surveys through their local networks.

Lastly, this research was planned, organized and carried out by KnK in Palestine. The remarks and opinions in this research report, however, are not necessarily official statements of the association.

Satoshi MORITA  
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## Composition of the Research Team

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**Editor**                      Satoshi MORITA

# Chapter 1 Understanding “Local Communities” in Palestine

## 1.1 Background

### (1) Political Conditions

The history of the conflict between Israel and Palestine is long and complicated. It is well documented in an abundance of literature and a full description is beyond the scope and purpose of this research. Nevertheless, a brief description of the recent history is helpful for understanding first the reality and challenges on the ground.

### 1) Recent History

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181, passed on 29 November 1947, called for the creation of Israel as well as an Arab state, thereby dividing British-mandate Palestine into two lands. Fighting erupted immediately thereafter. When the fighting ended several years later, approximately 870,000 Palestinians had fled their homes and become refugees in what is known as al Nakba (“the catastrophe”), Israel controlled far more land than its original allocation in the resolution, Jordan controlled the West Bank and East Jerusalem (see later), and Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip<sup>1</sup>.

The wars in 1967 and 1973 changed the region even further. The June 1967 Six-Day War, in which Israel gained control of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula, marked the beginning of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As a signatory to the Geneva Conventions, Israel is legally obligated to provide for the welfare of the Palestinian population under occupation. UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 called for Israel’s withdrawal from these territories, while UN Security Council Resolution 338, which followed the outbreak of hostilities in 1973, called for an immediate cessation of military activity and for the full implementation of the former resolution. Israel signed a peace accord with Egypt in 1978 (the Camp David accords) in which Egypt regained the Sinai Peninsula, and with Jordan in 1994.

East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip remained under Israeli occupation. The first Palestinian Intifada (uprising) broke out in December 1987. It was a widespread protest against Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land. A period of high hopes for peace occurred in the 1990s, with the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993. The Oslo Accords left many of the issues for “final status negotiations” five years later, but established the formula for a two-state

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<sup>1</sup> United Nations, *Publications and Statistics*, Retrieved on June. 29, 2012 from URL: <<http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/index.html>>.

solution for the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Hopes dimmed and frustration grew with the subsequent collapse of the Oslo accords as the decade wore on.

In September 2000, the leader of the Israeli opposition, Ariel Sharon, visited the Al-Aqsa Mosque in the Old City of Jerusalem with a Likud party delegation. The violence that erupted after this event marked the beginning of the second Intifada, also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada. According to B'tselem, an Israeli human rights organization focused on Palestine, 3,898 Palestinians and 1,011 Israelis died during the six years of the second Intifada<sup>2</sup>.

The violence has affected both sides, although the scale of violence has decreased in recent years. Some claim the “security fence” or “separation wall” constructed by the Israelis (see later) deserves credit for this decrease. It has been reported that Palestinians experienced increased movement restrictions, house demolitions, arrest and detention, and the construction of the fence that often divides families, separates farmers from their fields and individuals from their jobs.

Ordinary Palestinians catalogue the negative impacts of the occupation and the fence. In most cases, the occupation is the defining fact of their daily lives. Palestinian freedom of movement, even within the West Bank, is restricted by various mechanisms: earthen barriers, ditches, trenches, gates and terminals between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza<sup>3</sup>.

In addition, Palestinians face regular identity card checks at checkpoints and terminals as well as in what are known as “flying” checkpoints (i.e., police or military erect a random barrier of some kind to stop individuals and check their IDs), or sporadic ID checks within Israel (e.g., for passengers on Arab buses in Jerusalem). This is known as the “permit system” (see later). At times, Israel implements a complete closure, thereby preventing all Palestinians from crossing into Israel and from moving within the West Bank.

In his overview about the humanitarian crisis in the occupied Palestinian Territories (oPT) in November 2004, David Shearer, then Head of OCHA in Jerusalem in 2004 mentioned that despite the peace process had collapsed with the start of the 2000 Intifada, aid has continued to prop up structures such as the Palestinian Authority (PA) while the search for a new political settlement goes on<sup>4</sup>. Aid today, therefore, lacks the political framework of a peace agreement. However, without it the Palestinian economy would almost certainly collapse. That would

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<sup>2</sup> The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B'TSELEM), *Statistics – Fatalities*, Retrieved on Sep. 25, 2012 from URL: <<http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Casualties.asp>>.

<sup>3</sup> The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has extensively documented movement and access restrictions, closures, and the wall route on its website (<http://www.ochaopt.org>).

<sup>4</sup> Shearer, D., “The Occupied Palestinian Territory,” in Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN), *Humanitarian Exchange* No. 28, Overseas Development Institute: London, 2004 (<http://www.odihpn.org/download/humanitarianexchange028pdf>).

provoke a calamity in terms of human suffering, further inflame violence and increase instability<sup>5</sup>. Unfortunately, his prediction came to reality.

In August 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip, which it had occupied since June 1967. After an initial period of optimism, the humanitarian situation there has worsened, not improved, as Israel still controls access to and from Gaza. The economy remains stagnant, and people struggle to cope. Elections in early 2006 dramatically affected the humanitarian situation for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza.

On 28 January 2006, the Palestinian population elected Hamas, a Sunni Islamic political party, to the majority in the Palestinian Legislature, giving them the right to form the government. The United States (U.S.) government, the European Union (EU) and some other nations view Hamas as a terrorist organization.

In response to the Palestinian elections, the Quartet<sup>6</sup> (as well as Canada) decided to suspend aid to the Hamas-controlled PA – its resumption is conditional on Hamas' acceptance of Israel's right to exist, a commitment to nonviolence, and acceptance of previous agreements. The EU, with the approval of the Quartet, has set up a "Temporary International Mechanism" to support some basic services and salaries for some PA employees, and the World Bank continues to fund some projects through the PA<sup>7</sup>.

In addition, Israel is withholding between USD 50 and 60 million in Value Added Tax (VAT) customs and duties that it collects on behalf of the PA every month. This sudden and complete interruption of the financial pipeline for Palestinians and the PA has caused severe hardship among Palestinians<sup>8</sup>. Many civil servants have not been paid or been paid only minimally since the suspension of funding to the cash-strapped PA in May 2006.

On 25 June 2006, Palestinian militants (Hamas and other groups) captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit at the Karem Shalom crossing into Gaza. On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah, known as a Shi'a Islamic militant group and political party based in Lebanon, kidnapped two Israeli soldiers and sparked a war between Hezbollah and Israel that continued for 34 days to 14 August 2006. While the war in Lebanon and the north of Israel captured headlines, the Israeli Defense Forces

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> The "Quartet" refers to the US, EU, Russia, and the UN.

<sup>7</sup> Fast, L., "*Aid in a Pressure Cooker*" – *Humanitarian Action in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Humanitarian Agenda 2015, Case Study n.7)*, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University: Medford, 2008 ([http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha\\_opt\\_other\\_ornization\\_report\\_tufts.pdf](http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_other_ornization_report_tufts.pdf)).

<sup>8</sup> For more on the human rights and humanitarian implications, see "Section XIII: The Humanitarian Crisis and Funding of the Palestinian Authority" in *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied since 1967*, Retrieved on Jun. 29, 2012 from URL: <<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/138/12/PDF/G0613812.pdf?OpenElement>>; and Sharp, J., *Congressional Research Service (CRS) report for Congress – U.S. Aid to the Palestinians*, 2006 (<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/60396.pdf>).

(IDF) launched “Operation Summer Rains” in Gaza in retaliation for Shalit’s kidnapping. Three days after the kidnapping, the Israeli military bombed the electrical supply in Gaza. While Gaza still receives some power via the electric grid in Israel, the power supply remains unstable and sporadic. The human rights group B’TSELEM has declared the action a war crime<sup>9</sup>. The UN and other humanitarian agencies have issued repeated warnings about the humanitarian situation in Gaza as well as in the West Bank.

Since the end of August 2006, the humanitarian situation has continued to deteriorate and the violence has escalated. The Israeli military has entered the Gaza Strip multiple times to conduct military operations. The purported reason for the military operations is to secure the release of Shalit and as a response to Palestinian rockets on nearby Israeli towns. Various news sources have reported continuing negotiations to exchange prisoners.

Stop-and-start negotiations have continued between the PA President, Mahmoud Abbas, and leaders of Hamas and Fatah, a major political party in the West Bank, about a unity government that would include members of Hamas as well as of Fatah and other parties, or a government not affiliated with any particular party that would break the sanctions deadlock and pave the way to easing the humanitarian situation.

The Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniya has offered to resign to break the economic boycott and resume financial aid to the PA and civil society organizations and ultimately end the suffering of the Palestinians<sup>10</sup>. In principle, the Quartet has reacted favorably to a unity government. These negotiations have been all the more difficult because of the escalating violence between Palestinian political factions – indeed, several news reports have referred to a state of “civil war” in Gaza. Teachers, health workers, and other PA civil servants have participated in partial or comprehensive strikes of varying length to protest the non-payment of salaries<sup>11</sup>.

On Friday 17 November 2006, the UN General Assembly passed a non-binding resolution calling for the end of Israeli military operations in Gaza. Later in November, a shaky cease-fire, which President Abbas negotiated with various Palestinian factions, took hold in exchange for Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza.

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<sup>9</sup> B’TSELEM, *Act of Vengeance – Israel’s Bombing of the Gaza Power Plant and Its Effects*, 2009 ([http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files2/publication/200609\\_act\\_of\\_vengeance\\_eng.pdf](http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files2/publication/200609_act_of_vengeance_eng.pdf)).

<sup>10</sup> BBC, “*Palestinian PM offers to resign*” on Nov. 10, 2006, Retrieved on Nov. 23, 2012 from URL: <[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/6136682.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6136682.stm)>.

<sup>11</sup> OCHA reported that 90% of the West Bank teachers were on strike while Gaza teachers were on strike from 2 September to 9 September. The PA Ministry of Health hospital and clinic staffs were on strike in the West Bank and for shorter periods in Gaza. The PA was able to provide a partial payment of salaries to PA employees, worth approximately USD 33 (OCHA, *Humanitarian Monitor*, September 2006 ([http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/oPt\\_Humanitarian\\_Monitor\\_September06.pdf](http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/oPt_Humanitarian_Monitor_September06.pdf))).

All of these factors highlight the difficulty of negotiating, signing, and eventually implementing a comprehensive peace settlement and underscore the dire humanitarian situation in which the vast majority of Palestinians live.

On December 2008, Israel again attacked Gaza to restore the captured soldier, this operation named “Cast Lead” lasted for a month leading to the loss of 1,500 Palestinian lives, and until now the situation in Gaza is still the same, the siege, the reconstruction efforts and the infighting between Hamas and Fatah, despite the long rounds of negotiation between the two Palestinian factions, and the Arab Spring which changed the regime in Egypt<sup>12</sup>.

In August 2009, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad announced a unilateral plan, for the first time for Palestine since the signing of the 1993 Oslo accords, to establish a *de facto* Palestinian state following a two year state-building process including establishing infrastructure, public institutions and services, and tax incentives for foreign investors. This plan was followed by Palestine’s international lobbying campaign to convince the world's governments to support recognition of the Palestinian state in September 2011 at the United Nations. Palestine, as a result of lobbying, seemed to gain support from over 100 countries, although its initiative was finally rejected by the U.S. stating that it would impose its veto on the move at the United Nations Security Council<sup>13</sup>.

In the meantime, the peace process between the two parties was stalled. In September 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama paved path for direct talks among the relevant parties in order to forge the framework of a final agreement of forming a two-state solution for the Jewish and the Palestinian people. The Israeli government, however, clearly rejected any possible agreement with the Palestinian side because of the presence of Hamas threatening the progress and Palestine’s refusal to recognize Israel as Jewish state. Also, PA President Mahmoud Abbas asserted that Israel should stop settlement building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in order for peace talks to resume<sup>14</sup>.

Since Palestine’s application for full membership at the United Nations was stalled, Palestine had decided, by September 2012, to pursue an upgrade in status from "observer entity" to "non-member observer state" at the United Nations General Assembly, following the

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<sup>12</sup> News sources included the New York Times (“*Israeli shelling kills 18 Gazans – Anger boils up*” on Nov. 9, 2006), CBC News (“*Hamas militants call for revenge after 18 Palestinians killed*” on Nov. 8, 2006), UN News Service (“*UN officials voice ‘shock and dismay’ at deadly Israeli shelling of Gaza civilians*” on Nov. 8, 2006) and Reuters (“*Palestinian PM Haniyeh says he may step aside*” on Nov. 10, 2006; and “*UN sets quick vote on text condemning Gaza attack*” on Nov. 10, 2006).

<sup>13</sup> American Thinker, “*Palestinian Perfidy*” on Jul. 22, 2012, Retrieved on Dec. 16, 2012 from URL: <[http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/07/palestinian\\_perfidy.html#ixzz2FES5qWN1](http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/07/palestinian_perfidy.html#ixzz2FES5qWN1)>.

<sup>14</sup> New York Times, “*Palestinians Restate Demands to Netanyahu*” on Apr. 17, 2012, Retrieved on Dec. 16, 2012 from URL: <[http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/18/world/middleeast/palestinians-deliver-letter-on-peace-talks-to-netanyahu.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/18/world/middleeast/palestinians-deliver-letter-on-peace-talks-to-netanyahu.html?_r=0)>.

admission of Palestine as a member state at the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) by its Executive Board in October 2011, and its official appeal was put to a vote in the General Assembly on November 29, 2012. Prior to the submission of the resolution, clashes suddenly started between Hamas and Israel on 14 November and continued until 21 November when a ceasefire was finally announced after days of negotiations between Hamas and Israel mediated by Egypt. Many Western countries expressed support for Israel's right to defend itself against attacks by Hamas, while several other Arab and Muslim countries condemned the Israeli operation named "Pillar of Defense." The resolution granting Palestine a non-member observer state was supported by a majority of states – i.e. 138 countries in favor, and thus approved at the General Assembly.

After the vote, the Israelis had already cut off Palestine's access to financial services, which is devastating for the PA economy depending on Israel. Also, the U.S. Congress had originally insinuating to cut off aid to the PA<sup>15</sup>. The future of Palestine's real statehood is still invisible.

## 2) Permit System

Under direct Israeli occupation, Palestinians are subjected to curfews and internal closures frequently imposed on cities, towns, villages and refugee camps. As of September 2011, there were more than 500 roadblocks and checkpoints obstructing Palestinian movement in the West Bank, and the number was still increasing<sup>16</sup>. These impediments obviously continue to choke economic activities and damage the social fabric, along with the well-being of the population in the West Bank<sup>17</sup>. Passage through them usually depends on the security situation, and policies seem to change on a monthly or even weekly basis. As a matter of fact, checkpoints may be closed completely for all Palestinians, or open for some Palestinians, or open for all Palestinians at any time.

Since March 2002, permits from the Israeli authorities have been required for Palestinians to travel from one district to another. The permit system is complex, and differs from city to city in the West Bank. Many types of permits exist such as work permit, sickness permit, visit permit, merchant permit, and holiday permits. According to OCHA, "permits" are required for the following purposes<sup>18</sup>:

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<sup>15</sup> Economist, "Palestinian Statehood – A Strategic Mistake by Everyone" on Sep. 14, 2011, Retrieved on Dec. 16, 2012 from URL: <<http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/09/palestine-statehood-0?page=1>>.

<sup>16</sup> OCHA, *Movement and Access in the West Bank*, September 2011 ([http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha\\_opt\\_MovementandAccess\\_FactSheet\\_September\\_2011.pdf](http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_MovementandAccess_FactSheet_September_2011.pdf)).

<sup>17</sup> OCHA, *Special Focus*, September 2012 ([http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha\\_opt\\_movement\\_and\\_access\\_report\\_september\\_exec\\_2012\\_english.pdf](http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_movement_and_access_report_september_exec_2012_english.pdf)).

<sup>18</sup> OCHA, *Special Focus*, June 2010 ([http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha\\_opt\\_movement\\_access\\_2010\\_06\\_16\\_english.pdf](http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_movement_access_2010_06_16_english.pdf)).

- crossing specific internal checkpoints;
- access to the “closed areas” between the Green Line (see later) and the security fence; and
- (for West Bank residents) access to work and their land in the Jordan Valley, as well as to Palestinian public and private institutions such as schools, hospitals, Chamber of Commerce, courts and private businesses in East Jerusalem.

In general, acquiring permits through an application to the Israeli authorities is quite lengthy because of its bureaucratic process, including a requirement of submitting a proof of the reason why people ask for a specific type of permit<sup>19</sup>. According to some locals, Palestinians at the age of 15 years and below used not to be required to hold any permit when crossing checkpoints, although it seems not to be always the case. In fact, Palestinians often face troubles at the checkpoints due to frequently changing regulations because there have been no clearly written policies or rules regarding the permit system at the checkpoints.

## **(2) Socio-Economic Conditions**

### **1) Economy**

Palestine experienced negative economic growth rates several years ago as its productive capacity steadily shrank. During 2006, the real gross domestic product (GDP) declined by 6.6%. It was estimated that 66% of the population in the Palestinian lived below the poverty line (88 % in Gaza)<sup>20</sup>. The unemployment rate was 24.2 % (35% in Gaza and 19% in the West Bank)<sup>21</sup>. Adding to the pressures of unemployment was a high labor force growth among the young population – it was estimated that around 40,000 young people entered the labor force annually<sup>22</sup>.

Recently, however, the economic conditions have been improving. Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) estimates indicated real per capita GDP and GNI grew by 8.7 percent and 7.3 percent respectively in 2008<sup>23</sup>. The rebound in per capita incomes was, no doubt, related to significant levels of external assistance provided to the PA which has fed the growth of public sector employment and domestic spending. Recovery in the West Bank income can also be

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<sup>19</sup> OCHA, *Special Focus*, July 2011 ([http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha\\_opt\\_barrier\\_update\\_july\\_2011\\_english.pdf](http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_barrier_update_july_2011_english.pdf)).

<sup>20</sup> Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), *Demographic and Socioeconomic Status of the Palestinian People*, 2006.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> PCBS, *National Accounts in Current and Constant Prices 2007-2008*, 2010.

attributed in part to the partial easing of internal mobility restrictions in 2008. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) had been forecasting, in a very positive way, economic growth in the West Bank in 2009<sup>24</sup>. As a matter of fact, the Palestinian GDP grew by 7.1% between the first and second quarter of 2011. Moreover, GDP per capita increased by 6.3% in the second quarter 2011 compared to the previous quarter, and increased by 10.6% compared with the second quarter 2010<sup>25</sup>.

## 2) Industry

Palestinian enterprises are mostly small. During 2004 as many as 91% of enterprises employed only 0 to 4 employees and 6% employed 5 to 9 employees. Only 0.2% employed more than 50 employees. The only sectors which experienced moderate growth were the service and information technology (IT) sectors<sup>26</sup>.

The Palestinian labor force has a deficit in skills in demand in the labor market. The majority of the labor force consists of lower skilled workers with limited education or highly educated people with theoretical skills with little relevance to the labor market. The Palestinian Ministry of Labor operates 11 vocational training centers (VTCs), initially established to produce semi-skilled labor to fulfill the needs of the Israeli economy<sup>27</sup>.

The growth of the service and IT sectors as well as the planned establishment of industrial zones in Palestine are likely to require new nontraditional qualifications from those that currently exist in the labor force. This gap can only be addressed through well-developed Technical and Vocational Educational Training (TVET) that can easily adapt and respond to changes in demand in the labor market.

## 3) High Cost of Living and Unemployment

In September 2012, many Palestinian cities witnessed protests as a reaction for the rise in the prices of most consumer products, especially fuel<sup>28</sup>. For many days a number of protesters

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<sup>24</sup> New York Times, "Signs of Hope Emerge in the West Bank" on Jul. 16, 2009, Retrieved on Nov. 30, 2012 from URL: <[www.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/world/middleeast/17westbank.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/world/middleeast/17westbank.html)>.

<sup>25</sup> Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), *Economical and Social Monitor*, 26, Retrieved on Sep. 25, 2012 from URL: <<http://pal-econ.org/Newsite/node/221>>.

<sup>26</sup> United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), *Joint Programme Proposal – Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in the Occupied Palestinian Territories*, 2008 (<http://www.unctopt.org/en/agencies/genderfund.pdf>).

<sup>27</sup> International Labour Organization (ILO), *Evaluation Summary – Entrepreneurship Education: Introduction of “Know about Business” in Vocational and Technical Trainings in Palestine*, 2012 ([http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed\\_mas/---eval/documents/publication/wcms\\_174956.pdf](http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_mas/---eval/documents/publication/wcms_174956.pdf)).

<sup>28</sup> Ma’an News Agency, "Protests across West Bank against High Cost of Living" on Sep. 4, 2012, Retrieved on Nov. 30, 2012 from URL: <<http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=517262>>.

went onto the streets in numerous Palestinian cities, demanding the cancelation of the Paris Protocol<sup>29</sup>. In fact, because of this bilateral economic agreement, originally designed to protect the Israeli economy by ensuring that any increase in the Israeli market is reflected in the Palestinian market, the PA cannot freely control trades over the borders of Palestine and thus prices of imported commodities in Palestine.

All these social demonstrations were a result of high percentage of unemployment in Palestine despite the recent economic growth in the region. PCBS forecasted an increase in the unemployment rate in the oPT due to the closure and barriers imposed on the movement of goods and people from and to the oPT, and a decrease in the number of Palestinian workers. The unemployment rate was forecasted to reach 29.4 percent through 2012, much higher than the expected rate in 2011 (24.8 percent), and the number of employed persons in the oPT was expected to decline by 7.2 percent. It is also reported that the unemployment rate is even higher among fresh undergraduates and women<sup>30</sup>.

#### **4) Food Insecurity and Healthcare Services**

In the oPT, food generally accounts for a large part of the total household expenditures in the oPT, making Palestinian families highly susceptible to variations in food prices and income levels. According to the results of a joint UN rapid food security survey conducted by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the World Food Programme (WFP) in 2008, 38 percent of the Palestinian population is food insecure – 25 percent in the West Bank while 56 percent in the Gaza Strip. Food insecurity was higher among refugees compared to non-refugees<sup>31</sup>.

According to a series of further surveys on socio-economic conditions and food security in the oPT, conducted by those agencies and PCBS since 2009, 1.3 million Palestinians (or 27 percent of the Palestinian households) were living in food insecurity and unable to meet their basic food and household expenses in 2011. Although the data shows an improvement in food insecurity by 9 percentage points from 2009 (36 percent of the population) and by 6 percentage

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<sup>29</sup> The Paris Protocol is an economic agreement concluded in 1994 between Palestine and Israel, setting the procedures and regulations governing economic relations between the two parties for the interim period. It allows the Israeli free trade policy and basic principle to be applied to Palestine (Palestinian Investment Promotion Agency (PIPA), *Economic Agreement with Israel (Paris Protocol)*, Retrieved on Nov. 30, 2012 from URL: <[http://pipa.gov.ps/paris\\_protocol.asp](http://pipa.gov.ps/paris_protocol.asp)>).

<sup>30</sup> PCBS, *Economic forecasting, 2012 (Press Release)*, 2011 ([http://82.213.38.42/Portals/\\_pcbs/PressRelease/EcoEstimate2012E.pdf](http://82.213.38.42/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/EcoEstimate2012E.pdf)).

<sup>31</sup> FAO, UNRWA and WFP, *Joint Rapid Food Security Survey in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2008 ([http://unispal.un.org/pdfs/RapidAssessmentReport\\_May08.pdf](http://unispal.un.org/pdfs/RapidAssessmentReport_May08.pdf)).

points from 2010<sup>32</sup>, this food insecurity still "...remains a direct consequence of income poverty and livelihoods erosion, leading to difficulties in accessing sufficient quantities of quality food"<sup>33</sup>.

With regard to healthcare services in Palestine, the situation has improved in the West Bank over the past years due to continued investment in its development through the efforts of the Palestinian Ministry of Health and the support of donors and other stakeholders as well as the recent reduction of internal barriers and easing of movement restrictions. However, remaining obstacles to the free movement of people and goods still impede the efficient functioning and delivery of healthcare services. Especially, some concerns are raised about services in areas in the West Bank where restrictions on movement and access are particularly severe. Also, the closure of the Gaza Strip is undermining the availability of healthcare services, hampering the provision of medical supplies and preventing patients from receiving timely treatment outside the region. Furthermore, the impact of the "security fence" (see later) and restricted access to hospitals in East Jerusalem remains areas of concern<sup>34</sup>.

## **5) Recent Financial Crisis and Donors' Support**

The PA suffers from a persisting financial crisis beginning in the middle of 2011 which have resulted in delays in the disbursement of public sector employees' salaries for a number of months. There were defects in the structure of the Palestinian budget which have contributed to the crisis. The West Bank economy did grow in 2011 as mentioned earlier, however at a slower rate than it did in the entire year of 2010. The slowdown in growth in the West Bank can be attributed to falling donor support combined with the uncertainty caused by the PA's fiscal crisis, as well as a lack of new easing of Israeli restrictions<sup>35</sup>.

According to a report measuring the cost of the Israeli occupation over the Palestinian economy, recently published by the Palestinian Ministry of National Economy, the costs inflicted by the Israeli occupation amounted to about USD 6.8 billion in the year 2010, which accounts for 85 percent of the GDP. It is worth noting that the report argues that the occupation costs the

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<sup>32</sup> FAO, UNRWA, WFP and PCBS, *Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey: West Bank and Gaza Strip, Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2011, 2012 (<http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp249301.pdf>).

<sup>33</sup> Representative Office of Japan to the Palestinian Authority, *Japan and WFP Hand-over In-kind Contribution to the People in Need in the West Bank (WFP/Japan ODA News Release on 8 December 2011)*, 2011 ([http://www.ps.emb-japan.go.jp/PressRelease/PressRelease2011/n08Dec2011\\_Eng.pdf](http://www.ps.emb-japan.go.jp/PressRelease/PressRelease2011/n08Dec2011_Eng.pdf)).

<sup>34</sup> World Health Organization (WHO), *Health Conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, and in the Occupied Syrian Golan – Report by the Secretariat*, 2010 ([http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf\\_files/WHA63/A63\\_28-en.pdf](http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA63/A63_28-en.pdf)).

<sup>35</sup> The World Bank, *Stagnation or Revival? Palestinian Economic Prospects*, 2012 (<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/WorldBankAHLCreportMarch2012.pdf>).

Palestinian budget about USD 1.8 billion annually<sup>36</sup>. Meanwhile, the PA received USD 2.5 billion of foreign aid in 2010, for instance<sup>37</sup>. This means that the end of the occupation would almost cancel out the PA's reliance on international aid.

## 6) Women's Situations in Palestine

Women face systematic discrimination in accessing employment, and female refugees are particularly vulnerable. Figures by UNRWA indicate that although 16.9% registered Palestine refugee households are female-headed; they represent 46.8% of households enlisted in the special hardship program<sup>38</sup>.

Employment opportunities for women are very few and often limited to jobs in the West Bank in Israeli settlements. Similarly to their male counterparts, most women, particularly those lacking skills, still hold low positions with compensation that does not meet minimum wage standards without the proper compensation of overtime work. Of particular concern are female graduates and impoverished women whose access to job markets is marginal. As a matter of fact, gains made by women in education are not being translated into employment although women represent about 50% of enrolment in tertiary education. Female participation in the formal labor market is amongst the lowest in the world at 15.2% (17.7% in the West Bank and 8% in Gaza). The unemployment rate for women with university degrees is 34% and young persons aged from 15 to 24 years represent over 67% of the all unemployed<sup>39</sup>.

The workplace offers little protection and the membership of trade unions is almost exclusively male (91.6%)<sup>40</sup>. Similarly, membership-based employers' organizations are largely male, with women members limited to traditional sectors.

Cooperatives in Palestine present an important means of survival and resilience and absorb about 15% of the working population. Women represent less than 20% of the total existing cooperative membership and 18% of employees and are concentrated in credit/savings and crafts cooperatives<sup>41</sup>.

In a context of increasing violence and growing conservatism, women are more insecure and economically alienated. The obstacles women face in entering and remaining in the labor

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<sup>36</sup> The Palestinian Ministry of National Economy and the Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem (ARIJ), *The Economic Costs of the Israeli Occupation for the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2012 (<http://www.un.org/depts/dpa/qpal/docs/2012Cairo/p2%20jad%20isaac%20e.pdf>).

<sup>37</sup> Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA), *Palestine/oPT – Key Figures*, Retrieved on Sep. 25, 2012 from URL: <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/palestineopt>.

<sup>38</sup> UNSCO, *Joint Programme Proposal – Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in the Occupied Palestinian Territories*, 2008 (<http://www.unctopt.org/en/agencies/genderfund.pdf>).

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

market include patriarchal social systems that favor female domesticity and a reproductive role. Gender-based stereotypes on women's role and position in the workplace are common and are reflected in policy and practice.

### **(3) Socio-Economic Conditions of “Refugees”**

#### **1) “Refugee” Status in Palestine**

The socio-economic conditions of “refugees” need to be highlighted as a crucial factor for understanding Palestinian society. Strictly speaking, all registered “refugees” were either born in the area of Mandate Palestine that was incorporated into Israel in 1948 (about 3 percent of living registered refugees) or are the children, grandchildren, great grandchildren or great, great grandchildren of those born there. This would also apply to the 8.5 percent of the West Bank registered refugee population who were born outside of the oPT.

According to the Demographic Survey, conducted jointly by PCBS and the Institute for Applied Social Science (Fafo) in 1995, of Palestinians born before 1948 and living in the West Bank, more than 70 percent were born in the West Bank and still lived in the region in which they were born. The majority of those not born in the West Bank were born in the portion of Mandate Palestine. The portion of this cohort born in the former Palestine ranged from 9 percent in the Hebron area and 13 percent in the Jerusalem area to 46 percent in the Jericho area. This suggests limited internal migration among the pre-1948 born cohort, although about 30 percent were forced migrants from Mandate Palestine<sup>42</sup>.

There was even less internal migration among the cohort born during 1949 to 1967 which accounts for about 80 to 90 percent of them in their birth region during the time period, and even less internal migration among those born after 1967 which accounts for more than 90 percent in their birth region<sup>43</sup>.

Local and regional migration within the West Bank between 1987 as the reference year and 1995 as the year of the demographic survey was dominated by women aged 15 to 35 years, which suggests that these movements were due mainly to marriages from other parts of the West Bank<sup>44</sup>. Overall, only about 4.5 percent of the population surveyed had changed residences within the West Bank during 1987 and 1995. Another 4.8 percent reported that they

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<sup>42</sup> Randall, S., “Chapter 7: Migration” in Pedersen, J. *et al.* (eds.), *Growing Fast: The Palestinian Population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip*, Fafo, 2001 (<http://almashriq.hiof.no/general/300/320/327/fafo/reports/353.pdf>).

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

were abroad in 1987, having returned after that year. 90.6 percent of the West Bank population reported that they had neither migrated internally nor internationally during 1987 and 1995<sup>45</sup>.

Presumably, these patterns were equally manifest among refugees as among non-refugees. As suggested by the above information and data, the population of the West Bank, refugees included, at least until the mid-1990s were mainly static in regards to internal migration, whether local or regional.

The relatively “fixed” pattern of residence over time was due in part to restrictions on such movement imposed by the occupation authorities who controlled (and still control) the population registered and, therefore, have the power to approve or disapprove a legal change of residence. Cultural factors, such as commitment to – and social support from – family and extended family tend to discourage distance migration. A third factor would be the relative costs and benefits of such migration in terms of employment, income and housing. Another indication of the fixity of residence is the pattern of housing tenure among registered refugees. As indicated by the 1997 and 2007 censuses, refugee household ownership of housing grew and is very similar to that of non-refugee households. By 2007, 80.1 percent of refugees in the West Bank lived in owned housing as compared to 81.3 percent for non-refugees households.

About 45,325 or 7.7 percent of the counted West Bank registered refugees were born outside of the West Bank. This compares to a foreign-born population about 4.9 percent for the non-refugee population<sup>46</sup>. Foreign-born registered refugees were concentrated in two main groups. First, those born in Arab countries – about 25,351 or about 56 percent of the foreign-born – were the largest group. Those born in Jordan accounted for about a half of them. Second, those born in parts of Mandate Palestine taken by Israel in 1948 – all of them 60 years of age or above – were estimated at about 15,532 or 34.2 percent of the “foreign born” and about 2.9 percent of the total registered refugee population.

In a joint PCBS/Fafo study, 61 percent of the household heads in the in the West Bank reported they had siblings, parents, children or a spouse living abroad. The labor migration during the time period (as opposed to permanent settlement abroad) was largely to the Arab Gulf countries and seen as temporary – the expectation was that such migrants would eventually return home.

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<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> PCBS, *Population, Housing and Establishment Census 2007 – Census Final Results in the West Bank*, 2008. There were a total of 125,581 persons counted excluding Palestinians in the J1 portion of the Jerusalem governorate which is defined, according to the PCBS, to “include parts of Jerusalem which were annexed forcefully by Israel following its occupation of the West Bank in 1967, and these parts include the following localities (Beit Hanina, Shu’fat Refugees Camp, Shu’fat, Al’ Isawya, Sheikh Jarrah, Wadi Al-Joz, Bab Al-Sahira, As Suwwana, At-Tur, Al-Quds “Jerusalem”, Ash-Shayyah, Ras Al-Amud, Silwan, Ath-Thuri, Jabal Al-Mukabbir, As-Sawahra Al-Gharbiya, Beit Safafa, Sharafat, Sur Bahir and Um Tuba” ([http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/\\_pcbs/PressRelease/quds/qpress\\_e.pdf](http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/quds/qpress_e.pdf)).

Among the refugee heads of household the proportion with close relatives abroad was 66 percent, of which 26 percent reported having close relatives in the Gulf Arab states. Non-refugees reported the same proportion of close relatives in the Gulf States<sup>47</sup>. Thus, the phenomenon of labor migration outside of the West Bank was not a peculiarity of refugees, at least up to the mid-1990s<sup>48</sup>.

In general, Palestinians had relatives abroad in numerous countries, including all the Arab countries. The majority of overseas relatives lived in Jordan, especially for West Bank Palestinians. This was true of relatives who never had an Israeli ID card (because they either fled the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 or because they were born in Jordan), as well as relatives with an Israeli ID card – i.e. oPT out-migrants.

Except for Jordan, there were few relatives of oPT Palestinians living in neighboring countries (e.g. Lebanon, Syria and Egypt) and few of them ever possessed an Israeli ID card indicating they were not oPT out-migrants. There were substantial numbers of relatives of Palestinians in Gulf Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In both places, a sizeable proportion of them were not oPT out-migrants, never having possessed an Israeli ID card. There were smaller concentrations of relatives in other Arab countries, in Europe, North America, Australia and elsewhere. Refugee status had little effect on the propensity to out migrate, nor on the pattern of international relationships<sup>49</sup>.

Remittances are transfers of money by family members living abroad. Because some portion of such intra-family transfers occur informally (e.g. transported by friends or family in cash), it is difficult to track remittances with accuracy. Preliminary data indicates that the average annual inflow of transfers to non-government entities (and in nominal terms) was an average of USD 729.5 million during 2000 and 2008 – about USD 223 in per capita terms.

While data on registered refugee citizenship/nationalities was not available, the census data indicates that 99.9 percent of the total counted census population reported having Palestinian citizenship/nationality. Only 1,745 persons were recorded as having other than Palestinian citizenship/nationality in a total count of 2,056,298 in the West Bank<sup>50</sup>.

Using the data on places of birth of registered refugees, and assuming that all those born in Israel (post-1949), in Jordan and in non-Arab foreign countries possess foreign passports, this

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<sup>47</sup> UNRWA, *Palestine Refugees in the West Bank – Socio-economic Trends and Long-term Opportunities*, 2011 (<http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2011110145541.pdf>). The data includes population counted during the period of 1-16 December 2007 and does not include uncounted population estimates according to post enumeration survey. The count excludes registered refugees in the J1 portion of the Jerusalem governorate (*Ibid.*).

<sup>48</sup> Hovdenak, A., *et al.*, *Constructing Order: Palestinian Adaptations to Refugee Life*, Fafo, 1997.

<sup>49</sup> Randall, S., "Chapter 7: Migration" in Pedersen, J. *et al.* (eds.), *Growing Fast: The Palestinian Population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip*, Fafo, 2001.

<sup>50</sup> PCBS, *Population, Housing and Establishment Census 2007 – Census Final Results in the West Bank*, 2008.

would amount to 16,883 persons, of whom 12,680 would hold a Jordanian passport. On the other hand, if the assumption is made that all those born before 1988, the year the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (HKJ) government relinquished all responsibilities for the West Bank to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), then about 80 percent of the registered refugee population could be in possession of a Jordanian passport.

## 2) Employment and Household Conditions

With regard to refugee employment in Israel and Israeli settlements, during the 2000 and 2008 period, the annualized average level of refugee employment there was about 16,615 persons. In 2008, the average was about 25,200 persons, about the same as that estimated for the year 2000<sup>51</sup>.

Given the Israeli separation policy, present and future employment levels for refugee and non refugee Palestinians from the West Bank are not expected to be as significant as they were in the 1980s and 1990s. Presumably, this would not apply to Palestinians in Jerusalem – both refugee and non refugee – who now have generally easier access to the Israeli labor market due to their presence in Jerusalem<sup>52</sup>.

Regarding the income conditions of refugees, the household income can be estimated on the basis of the level of monthly household expenditures. In 2007, the West Bank average refugee household – consisting of 6.3 persons – had about USD 995.8 in monthly expenditures<sup>53</sup>, which was slightly higher than for non-refugee households who had average monthly expenditures of USD 979.8. On an annual basis, the average refugee-headed household in the West Bank would therefore have spent about USD 11,950. Based on this, it assumed that refugee-headed households, on average, generated income at this amount, in 2007, less any debt contracted to support expenditures<sup>54</sup>.

The 2007 census revealed that 34.2 percent of the registered refugee population 10 years of age and older were economically active – i.e. whether working or unemployed (having worked in the past and seeking work, or having been unemployed and seeking work for the first time). Of these, about 83.7 percent were employed while 16.3 percent were unemployed.

Registered refugees aged 10 years and above and not economically active accounted for 65.7 percent of that population. Of these, 52.6 percent were in schools or undergoing training,

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<sup>51</sup> UNRWA, *Palestine Refugees in the West Bank – Socio-economic Trends and Long-term Opportunities*, 2011 (<http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2011110145541.pdf>). Refugees include both registered and non-registered refugees. The estimates include refugees residing in the J1 portion of the Jerusalem governorate (*Ibid.*).

<sup>52</sup> PCBS, *Population, Housing and Establishment Census 2007 – Census Final Results in the West Bank*, 2008.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> To more accurately measure the level of average household income would require information on the level of savings during the relevant period.

another 34.7 percent were engaged in housekeeping activities of some sort and 9.1 percent were aged, disabled or ill.

The share of economically-active non-refugees was slightly below that of refugees at 33.2 percent. The corresponding share that was not active, the census found, was 66.8 percent. The share of economically active non-refugees who were employed was 86.4 percent, 2.7 percentage points higher than for refugees. The share that was unemployed was 13.6 percent, about 2.7 percentage points below that for refugees. Of the non-refugee, non-active (66.8 percent of that population), the proportions who were studying, housekeeping, or disabled were very similar to those of refugees.

Using the standardized ILO definition of labor force – those 15 years of age and above who were either working or seeking work, the refugee labor force numbered an average of about 187,000 persons (including East Jerusalem) in 2008, both registered and non-registered. Of these, about 149,700 (about 80 percent) were employed and about 37,300 were unemployed<sup>55</sup>. According to the standard ILO definition, the corresponding non-refugee labor force was about 418,350, of whom 340,675 (81.4 percent) were employed and 77,675 were unemployed.

The rate of habitat ownership rose from about 69.6 percent in 1997 to more than 80 percent in 2007. At the same time those renting increased in absolute terms but, as a proportion of all households, those renting unfurnished habitats declined markedly such that, in 2007, only 5.2 percent of refugee households fell into that category of tenure<sup>56</sup>.

The rental of furnished units grew in absolute and relative terms more quickly than any other tenure category in the decade between the censuses. Most significantly, the absolute number and proportion of households not paying for housing declined sharply. This may suggest that refugee households originally residing in camps who formally did not own and did not pay rent have bought housing outright or moved into rented accommodations. Census data also indicates that 59 percent of refugees lived in apartments in 2007, with 39.2 percent of refugees living in individual homes<sup>57</sup>.

Data from the census indicates that of 97,627 counted registered refugee households, about 51.1 percent were connected to water, electricity and sewage services. An additional 36.3 percent were connected to water and electricity only. Thus, 87.4 percent of registered refugee households were connected to both water and electricity. Additional numbers of households were connected to one or other public services, including 9.9 percent connected only to

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<sup>55</sup> PCBS, *Housing Report*, 2010.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> UNRWA, *Palestine Refugees in the West Bank – Socio-economic Trends and Long-term Opportunities*, 2011 (<http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2011110145541.pdf>).

electricity. This data suggests that about 12 percent of registered refugee households were not directly connected to a source of water and about 2.5 percent were not connected to electricity while about 48 percent were not connected to sewage facilities. By comparison, only 77.3 percent of non-refugee households in the West Bank were connected to two or three of these public services. Only about 27.5 percent were connected to all of water, electricity and sewage services, while 49.8 percent were connected to water and electricity only. Registered refugee households were far more likely to have all three services than non-refugee ones.

Refugees accounted for about 30 percent of the public sector work force in the West Bank during 2000 to 2008, a somewhat higher proportion than their share in the total population. In the first half of 2009, an estimated average of 25,380 West Bank refugees was employed by the PA<sup>58</sup>.

### 3) Poverty and Coping Strategies

The definitions of poverty used by the PCBS are based on household expenditures and consumption – and not on income. Such an approach is considered more accurate in measuring actual living levels and needs<sup>59</sup>. The two poverty lines used – official poverty and deep poverty – were developed in 1998 by the Palestinian National Commission for Poverty Alleviation on the basis of actual average consumption expenditures of Palestinian households<sup>60</sup>.

The official poverty line was established taking into account nine categories of goods and services consumed by Palestinian households: food, clothing, housing, utensils and bedding, housekeeping supplies, health care, personal care, education and transportation. Adjusting for size, households are then ranked from highest to lowest on the basis of monthly expenditures for these items. Those households whose consumption of these items are below the average household in the 30th percentile (from the lowest) and adjusted for household size are defined as the official poor.

In 2007, PCBS estimated the official poverty line to be NIS 2,237 (\$609) per month for a household of two adults and three children, taking into account the costs of health care, education, transportation, personal care, and housekeeping supplies. A "deep poverty" line was set at 1,783 shekels (\$478) per month for a household of two adults and three children, taking only into account a budget for food, clothing and housing<sup>61</sup>.

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<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> For a discussion on the relative merits of a consumption approach, refer to UNRWA, *Prolonged Crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory – Recent Socio-Economic Impacts*, 2006.

<sup>60</sup> Palestinian National Authority (PNA), *National Commission for Poverty Alleviation Palestine Poverty Report*, 1998.

<sup>61</sup> Ma'an News Agency (MNA), *PCBS: 25% live below poverty line*, Retrieved on Sep. 26, 2012 from URL: <<http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=377707>>.

Adjusting for household size, households or individuals living below this consumption level are considered to lack some of the material requirements for a minimally dignified life. The deep poverty line is calculated with consideration for household consumption of only levels in three categories of goods and services: food, clothing and housing. Households are ranked from highest to lowest with respect to monthly expenditures for these basic sets of items. After adjusting for household size, households whose consumption of the basics is below the average household in the 30th percentile (from the lowest) are defined as deep poor.

The 2007 deep poverty line for the representative household is estimated by PCBS at NIS 1,886 in monthly consumption expenditures or about USD 454.4. On the basis of the representative family, this translates into a deep per capita poverty line of about USD 76.7 per month or about USD 2.5 per day. Households or individuals consuming below this level are considered unable to meet basic needs.

In the West Bank, the refugee household official poverty rate was estimated at 23.8 percent in 2007, about 4 percentage points higher than that for non-refugee households. Also, deep household poverty among West Bank refugee households was estimated at 12.9 percent. Despite the fact that external assistance – whether from UNRWA or other sources – increased in 2007, this was not sufficient to stem the growth of refugee poverty in the West Bank where the poverty rates had more than doubled since 2000.

Since the beginning of the prolonged socio-economic crisis in late 2000, Palestinian households have relied on a spectrum of coping mechanisms. Fafo found that Palestinian households in the earlier part of the crisis had relied mainly on wider sharing of wage incomes of the employed, reducing household savings and expenditures, selling off household assets (e.g. gold, land), and greater labor market effort. This was augmented later by borrowing from friends, relatives and local merchants<sup>62</sup>, changing the types of food purchased, and postponing the payment of rents and of electricity and water bills. Later, this was accompanied by greater reliance on day, temporary and/or informal labor, on animal husbandry and agriculture<sup>63</sup>, and on greater levels of external assistance, including that from the expanded aid effort that reached about 25 percent of the West Bank population in 2006<sup>64</sup>. In addition to food and cash assistance, the sources of aid included the Ministry of Social Affairs, food for work or food for training

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<sup>62</sup> For the West Bank as a whole, the most important source of external assistance during the six years of the second Intifada was relatives, often in the form of food and/or olive oil (Hasselknippe, G., and Tveit, M., *Against the Odds – How Palestinians Cope through Fiscal Crisis, Closures and Boycott*, Fafo, 2007). In addition, 65 percent of West Bank households were indebted, one-quarter of whom had debts in excess of USD 5,000 in 2008 (Mitchell, L., *Making Ends Meet: Gender and Household Coping Strategies in the West Bank*, Fafo, 2009 (<http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/20138/20138.pdf>)).

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

programs (including those operated by the World Food Program), the job creation and micro-finance programs by UNRWA as well as political and religious organizations<sup>65</sup>.

#### **(4) Education Sector and Socio-Economic Environment for Children and Youths**

##### **1) Primary and Secondary Education**

Throughout decades of conflict, occupation and dispossession, education in the oPT has been the road to survival for youths and the nation. Yet, the constant pressure burdened the community and later affected the educational systems especially in the first Intifada (1987-1993) when schools were closed for many months.

In the 1990s, school enrollment increased substantially. A priority was placed on new construction and rehabilitation, and efforts toward greater inclusiveness were stressed, especially for girls and children with disabilities. Technical, vocational, and early childhood education were also addressed, as well as a curriculum reflecting Palestinian history and heritage, culminating the final year Tawjihi (university entrance) exam that assesses student readiness for higher education as well as their qualifications in certain fields.

Before the Oslo Accords (see later) were signed, Palestinian students studied in the curriculums developed by the Israeli military governor office for the oPT. Then the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE), newly established in 1994, used the Jordanian curriculums while developing Palestinian national curriculums. These new curriculums took 10 years for development before being put into practice at Palestinian schools in 2008. The MoEHE administers three-fourths of schools in the oPT and handle two-thirds of its students<sup>66</sup>.

In the oPT, its education system is composed of primary and secondary stages. The primary stage covers from the first up to the tenth grade and is composed of two phases, namely the preparatory phase (from the first up to the fourth grade) and the empowerment phase (from the fifth until the tenth grade). The secondary stage lasts for two years when students study relevant subjects in their tracks such as sciences, literature, agriculture, business and management, industry, tourism, etc. Most Palestinian students take scientific or literature tracks as their main choice and conclude 12 years of education with the Tawjihi exam which is administered by the MoEHE.

Initially, it was not easy to unify education systems in the oPT mainly due to the fact that different curricula were used in different areas – Jordanian curriculum in the West Bank and

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<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>66</sup> Nicolai, S., *Fragmented Foundations: Education and Chronic Crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) at UNESCO and Save the Children U.K., 2007 (<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001502/150260e.pdf>).

Egyptian Curriculum in Gaza. Still, the situation is complicated. As a matter of fact, there are three different types of schools depending on the administrative bodies in the oPT as shown below.

- **government (public) schools:** directly administered by the MoEHE of the PA, put into practice after the signature of the Oslo Accords.
- **UNRWA schools:** administered by UNRWA in the refugee camps, mainly concentrated in Gaza strip.
- **private schools:** administered by committees, charities, religious dominations and individuals.

According to the PBCS, there were 2,704 primary and secondary schools as of May 2012, of which 2,004 are government schools, 341 UNRWA schools and 359 private schools, and a total of 1,396,164 students were receiving education, of whom 50.1 were females and 49.9 males<sup>67</sup>. It is said that private and UNRWA schools generally provide better education services than government schools due to the availability of budget, although the issue of education quality needs to be examined from various aspects and perspectives.

In addition to these three types of schools, there are Israeli Municipality (public) schools that are directly administered by the Israeli authorities in East Jerusalem<sup>68</sup>. As a matter of fact, the education environment in East Jerusalem is intricate. According to the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), as of September 2011 there are a total of 185 schools of five different types in East Jerusalem, including: 1) 57 official public schools recognized and administered by the Israeli authorities; 2) 53 schools that are recognized but unofficial; 3) 35 private schools; 4) 32 government schools administered by the MoEHE; and 5) 8 UNRWA schools<sup>69</sup>. It is estimated that 88,000 students study at all these schools where the Palestinian curriculum is used without exception, meanwhile about 4,400 Arab children are not registered with any educational institution in East Jerusalem<sup>70</sup>.

After the start of second Intifada in 2000, the education environment in the oPT was highly impacted by Israel's countermeasures of structural school closures. As a result, the earlier momentum in developing education systems in the oPT was lost, access to education

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<sup>67</sup> PCBS, *Palestine in Figures 2011*, 2012 ([http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/\\_PCBS/Downloads/book1855.pdf](http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1855.pdf)). The data was still preliminary at the time of publication of the report.

<sup>68</sup> The schools affiliated with the Israeli Municipality are not included in the PBCS's statistics as shown above.

<sup>69</sup> ACRI, *The East Jerusalem School System – Annual Status Report*, 2011 (<http://www.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Education-report-2011-FINAL.pdf>). In the report, East Jerusalem can be apparently interpreted as in the Israeli definition.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

deteriorated, and education quality suffered. The more repressive Israel's measures became, the more adaptive MoEHE had to be to function under the conditions of chronic instability, conflict and crisis.

UNESCO's "Education for All (EFA) Global Monitoring Report 2008" shows the gross intake rates in Palestine in 2005 around when the second Intifada ended – 89 percent in primary, 99 percent in secondary and 38 percent in tertiary education. The report also warned that the oPT was at the risk of not achieving the goal of universal primary enrolment by 2015 set at the World Education Forum in Dakar in 2000<sup>71</sup>.

On the other hand, there are some positive statistics of the educational attendance rates of children and youths in 2010, five years after the above-shown data – 97.7 percent for those between 6 and 11 years, 97.5 percent for those between 12 and 14 years, and 87.4 percent for those between 15 and 17 years of age<sup>72</sup>. The situation obviously seems to be improving overall, especially at the primary and tertiary levels, during the five years when the socio-political conditions were generally more stable compared to between 2000 and 2005. It may not be impossible for Palestine to achieve the goal by 2015 only if the socio-political conditions will remain relatively stable. Needless to say, the quality of education will remain a very important issue at the same time.

## 2) Higher Education

In Palestine, higher education institutions (HEIs) came into existence in the 1950s. Two-year colleges focusing on teacher training, technical education or liberal arts have been established either by the government or UNRWA since the 50s, and universities started to be established during the Israeli occupation in the 70s in response to the increasing numbers of high school graduates at that time. Since then, HEIs have helped preserve the Palestinian identity by providing young Palestinians with opportunities to pursue higher education in their own land. Meanwhile, the sector started to expand only after the transfer of education to the PA from Israel after the Oslo Accords (see later)<sup>73</sup>.

The Law No. 11 of 1998 on Higher Education, by which higher education was legislated, ensures every citizen a right to higher education, gives legal status to HEIs, and provides a legal framework for their organization and management. The law recognizes three different categories

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<sup>71</sup> UNESCO, *EFA Global Monitoring Report 2008: Education for All by 2015 – Will We Make It?*, 2007 (<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001547/154743e.pdf>).

<sup>72</sup> PCBS, *Palestine in Figures 2011*, 2012 ([http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/\\_PCBS/Downloads/book1855.pdf](http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1855.pdf)).

<sup>73</sup> Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA) of the EU, *Higher Education in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2010 ([http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/tempus/participating\\_countries/reviews/occupied\\_palestinian\\_territory\\_review\\_of\\_higher\\_education.pdf](http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/tempus/participating_countries/reviews/occupied_palestinian_territory_review_of_higher_education.pdf)).

of institutions in higher education, namely 1) governmental institutions; 2) public institutions established by non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and 3) private institutions. Most HEIs in oPT fall into the “public” category for which some financial support is provided by the MoEHE. HEIs are mostly independent but have to follow the above-mentioned law and regulations of the Ministry and the Council of Higher Education (CHE)<sup>74</sup>.

HEIs in Palestine include institutions as follows:

- **universities:** including those offering 4 year bachelor’s programs in arts, sciences, law, etc., as well as master’s programs in social sciences and development and a Ph.D. program in pharmacy.
- **polytechnic institutes:** offering 3 to 4 year programs in technical profession.
- **community colleges:** including those offering 2 year programs of diploma in business and health services.
- **vocational training centers:** offering 6 to 12 month programs in management, marketing and information technology.

In the oPT there are 13 universities with 230,000 students, although its experiences are still limited. As a matter of fact, the rapid expansion of universities is at the expense of the quality of education and the sustainability of university recourses<sup>75</sup>. The imbalance of the PA’s income and expenditure has affected the HEIs budgets in the oPT. Universities heavily rely on tuitions paid by students while the bulk of their resources go toward faculty salaries. It appears that the sector of higher education is caught in a vicious circle – the decline in tuitions leads to the fiscal deficit which is reflected on lower salaries for the faculty staff. This in turn causes a decrease in the quality of education and negative effects on scientific research at universities. Taken all together, these elements reduce the competencies of the graduates and, as a result, may justify the increase in tuitions<sup>76</sup>.

## 1.2 Classification of Areas A, B and C in the Oslo Accords

### (1) General Overview

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<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> MoEHE, *Palestinian Higher Education Statistics 2009/2010*, 2010 (<http://www.moehe.gov.ps/Uploads/admin/Matweyeh2010.pdf>).

<sup>76</sup> MoEHE, *Education Sector and Cross-Sector Strategy 2011-2013*, 2010 (<http://www.moehe.gov.ps/Uploads/planning/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A9%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9%202011-2013/Stratigic%20Plan%202011-2013.pdf>).

The initiation of the Oslo peace process in September 1993 brought the hope and expectation among Palestinians and Israelis that a resolution to the conflict was attainable. Yet, in the years between Oslo's inception and its unofficial end in September 2000, when the Al-Aqsa uprising began, conditions in the West Bank and Gaza dramatically deteriorated to a point far worse than during any other period of Israeli occupation, providing the context for the current uprising. Illustrations of this decline include the influx of almost 100,000 new Israeli settlers into the West Bank and Gaza – which doubled the settler population – and the addition of at least 30 new Israeli settlements and settlement-related infrastructure since. During this time, the government of Israel confiscated over 40,000 acres of Palestinian land – much of it was viable agricultural land worth more than USD 1 billion – for Israeli settlement expansion and the paving of 350 kilometers of settler bypass roads onto expropriated Palestinian lands designed to connect Israeli settlements and divide Palestinian population centers.

Perhaps the significant indicator of Palestinian weakness during this period was the dissection of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into territorially noncontiguous enclaves that directly resulted from Oslo's terms.

The Oslo Accords, officially called the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, or the Declaration of Principles (DOP), and the process to which they gave shape were not about peace or reconciliation, but about security and Israel's continued control of Palestinian resources. In the words of one Israeli official, "...*both sides gained from this [security] cooperation. After all, Israel and the PA have one thing in common. Both want stability, not democracy, in the territories*"<sup>77</sup>.

Indeed, it is believed that the decision of Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli Prime Minister, to accept Arafat PLO leader to return and establish a governing authority was not based on Israel's desire to see democracy flourish in the West Bank and Gaza, but on the need to leave responsibility for controlling Palestinians to a body wholly dependent on and accountable to Israel. In this regard, the Oslo process, therefore, did not represent the end of Israeli occupation but its continuation, albeit in a less direct form. Some believe that the structural relationship between the occupier and the occupied, and the gross asymmetries in power that attends it, were not dismantled by the accords but reinforced and strengthened. In other words, the Oslo Accords formalized and institutionalized the occupation in a manner that was altogether new.

The Oslo I Accord, the DOP was signed on September 13, 1993. It contained several noteworthy features – the removal of international law as the basis for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the redeployment of Israeli forces from within circumscribed areas of the Gaza

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<sup>77</sup> Dempsey, J., "Move to Stop Israel's Policy of Liquidation," The Financial Times, January 9, 2001.

Strip and West Bank (beginning with the West Bank town of Jericho), the delinking of interim and final status issues (whose linkage was a major obstacle for both sides at the 1991 Madrid peace talks), the establishment of the PA, and mutual recognition. Perhaps the most critical feature of the Oslo process was the abandonment of the entire body of international law and resolutions pertaining to the conflict that had evolved over the last 53 years in favor of bilateral negotiations between two actors of grossly unequal power.

The only legal underpinning of the Oslo Accords was UN Security Council Resolution 242 (and 338 which reaffirms 242), calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from territories occupied in the 1967 war. However, Israel's interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 differed from that of the PLO and the international community. Israel viewed 242 as not requiring it to withdraw from all occupied Arab territories, given that the accepted English version of the resolution refers only to "territories" occupied in 1967, but not to "the territories" as is stated in the French version.

This ambiguity was deliberate. The PLO and the majority of the international community regarded Israel as an occupying power and understood 242 as requiring Israel to withdraw from all the Palestinian areas occupied in June 1967. Given the US position that negotiations would be based on "land for peace," Israel understood that it would have to relinquish some land. Its implicit objective was to assure that its interpretation of 242 would be the framework for negotiations. When Arafat signed the DOP and the subsequent interim agreements, he affirmed the Israeli position, which had prevailed and was reflected in all the Oslo Accords, none of which contains the word "occupation" or acknowledges Israel as an occupying power.

The Accords also do not recognize the right of Palestinian statehood, borders, or full equality. A review of the various Oslo Accords clearly demonstrates that Israel successfully established itself as the sole authority that would determine which land areas it would yield to the PA. The major confirmation of the Israeli position was the Hebron Protocol (see later). When Arafat signed the protocol in 1997 he conceded the Palestinian interpretation of 242 forever since the protocol gave Israel the right, supported explicitly by the US, to decide for itself from which of the occupied territories it would withdraw and from which it would not. Furthermore, the final status issues, such as borders, refugees, Jerusalem, and settlements, which lie at the core of the conflict, were not subject to the provisions of the DOP but were instead relegated to a later phase set to begin in May 1996.

However, not until Camp David II did Israel actually agree to make some commitments regarding key Palestinian national demands (e.g. the status of Jerusalem and the return of Palestinian refugees). In the interim, both the Labor and Likud governments created many "facts

on the ground” (e.g. the construction and expansion of settlements and the vast network of bypass roads) that compromised negotiations greatly. Settlement expansion and land confiscation were not expressly prohibited by the DOP. Contrary to the accepted belief, the PA had no legal power to stop Israeli measures. In fact, under the terms of the 1995 Oslo II Accord, which extended limited self-rule to the West Bank, the PA gave its legal seal of approval to the confiscation of certain Palestinian lands for the paving of Israeli bypass roads. In this and many other ways, the Oslo Accords did not aim to end the occupation but to normalize it<sup>78</sup>.

That the PA quickly revealed itself to be repressive and corrupt was not unwelcome by Israel or the US. Although Israel and the PLO traded “mutual” recognition by signing the Oslo I Accord, no power symmetry exists between them. Israel, a fully sovereign state, possesses total power, and the PLO-PA, the acknowledged representative of the Palestinian people, possesses virtually none. By reducing the conflict to power negotiations between two such unequal parties, the Oslo Accords reflected Israeli strength and Palestinian weakness, and not the application of accepted international law or universal standards of justice. In this regard and far less known is the fact that under the terms of Oslo I, Israeli military law – including the Israeli military government and approximately 2,000 military orders in effect before Oslo during direct Israeli occupation – remained the legal framework for governing the West Bank and Gaza after Oslo.

Thus, although the PA was assigned responsibility for various sectors of activity such as education and health, final authority over the territories, particularly regarding security and the economy, remained wholly with Israel. Furthermore, by agreeing to Israeli military government control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the PA, *ipso facto*, accepted both the existence and legitimacy of Israeli occupation.

## **(2) Defining Each Area**

The Oslo II Accord, the “Interim Agreement,” was signed September 28, 1995. A key feature of Oslo II was the division of the West Bank into three areas, each under varying degrees of Palestinian or Israeli control.

The territorial division of the West Bank legalized in the Oslo II Accord was first carried out in the Gaza Strip just one month after the famous handshake between Rabin and Arafat on the White House lawn. In the Taba negotiations that took place in October 1993, Israel presented and eventually implemented a plan that grouped Jewish settlements in Gaza into three blocs including the lands between the individual settlements. These blocs, combined with a network of

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<sup>78</sup> Dajani, S., *What Are the Terms of the Oslo “Peace Process.”* Retrieved on Sep. 26, 2012 from URL: <[http://tari.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=8:what-are-the-terms-of-the-oslo-qpeace-process&catid=1:fact-sheets&Itemid=9](http://tari.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8:what-are-the-terms-of-the-oslo-qpeace-process&catid=1:fact-sheets&Itemid=9)>.

bypass roads and military bases, comprise around a third of Gaza's land, now home to 6,000 Israeli settlers. The remaining two-thirds of Gaza, cut into cantons, was left to 1.1 million Palestinians, leaving roughly 128 Israelis per square mile in Gaza compared to 11,702 Palestinians per square mile.

With the Oslo II, the Gaza arrangement was extended to the West Bank in the form of Areas A, B, and C. Area A, which initially consisted of seven major Palestinian towns, is under the total civilian and security control of the PA. Area B comprises the remaining Palestinian population centers (excluding some refugee camps) where civilian control resides with the PA and security control with Israel, which effectively places Area B under Israeli jurisdiction. Area C, which incorporates all Israeli settlements, "state lands," and Israeli military bases, remains under the total control of Israel.

By mid-2000, Area A comprised 17.2 percent and Area B 23.8 percent of the West Bank, whereas Area C incorporated the remaining 59 percent. In practical terms, therefore, by the time of the Camp David summit, Israel actually controlled almost 83 percent of the West Bank according to the terms of the Oslo Accord<sup>79</sup>.

Thus, while the absolute area under full or partial Palestinian control had increased, these areas were noncontiguous and remained isolated cantons separated by areas under the complete jurisdiction of Israel. Under this scenario, even if Palestinians had been given authority over 90 to 95 percent of the West Bank – as allegedly proposed by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak at Camp David II – they would have had five enclaves isolated from each other by several Israeli settlement blocs, along with highways, industrial infrastructure, and army checkpoints.

Moreover, Palestinians would not have control over borders – internal or external – to the West Bank or Gaza. That control would remain with Israel, and Palestine's only borders would be with Israel. In this way, the division of the West Bank into territorial sections, itself inconceivable in other national contexts and illegal under international law, would give Israel a new mechanism with which to ensure control over Palestinians and their resources even if a Palestinian state is declared.

With the Oslo II Accord, Israel gained legal control over a majority of the West Bank, which is what it had sought since 1967. The territorial divisions agreed to in the Oslo II Accord established the framework for a final settlement in the West Bank that would preclude any territorial continuum for a future Palestinian state and ensure the continued presence of the Israeli occupation in some form.

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<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

As a result, by accepting the division of the West Bank according to the provisions of the Accord, the Palestinians also accepted the legitimacy of Israeli settlements in the oPT.

### **(3) The Hebron Protocol: Defining New Precedents**

The Oslo I Accord brokered by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's administration – the Hebron Protocol – was signed on January 15, 1997. It introduced some important departures from earlier accords and set new precedents for future negotiations.

According to the Protocol, the city of Hebron was redeployed by Israel and divided into two parts, namely H1 and H2. The PA retained about 80 percent of Hebron, or H1, home to 100,000 Palestinians, whereas Israel gained full control over the remaining 20 percent or H2, where approximately 250 to 400 Israeli settlers, protected by the Israeli army, live among 30,000 Palestinians<sup>80</sup>.

H2 is the downtown, commercial area. The Protocol contains no reference to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 or 338 as the legal framework for negotiations. Furthermore, in a letter appended to the document from former US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the US explicitly pledged its full support for Israel's interpretation of its obligations under these accords, which stipulate that Israel alone will decide the timing and scope of any future redeployment. Furthermore, such redeployments are to be conditioned on Palestinians meeting their responsibilities as defined by Israel<sup>81</sup>.

Hebron's division into two parts created an important precedent for the further division of Palestinian lands into isolated enclaves on territories where Palestinians expect to achieve statehood. The PA's acceptance of an armed Israeli settler presence in a predominantly Palestinian population center also established another precedent for the permanence of Israeli settlements throughout the West Bank and Gaza and, by extension, for the bifurcation of Palestinian lands that results from the presence of those settlements.

The Protocol also makes clear and concrete the right of Israel to decide unilaterally, and not through negotiations, when and how it will fulfill its obligations.

### **(4) Fragmentation of "Communities" in Palestine**

The Oslo peace process and the conditions it imposed were directly linked to, and shaped by, Israeli closure policy, which has had a devastating impact on the Palestinian economy and

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<sup>80</sup> *The Hebron Protocol* (<http://www.palestine-studies.org/files/pdf/jps/2268.pdf>).

<sup>81</sup> Dajani, S., *What Are the Terms of the Oslo "Peace Process,"* Retrieved on Sep. 26, 2012 from URL: [http://tari.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=8:what-are-the-terms-of-the-oslo-qpeace-process&catid=1:fact-sheets&Itemid=9](http://tari.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8:what-are-the-terms-of-the-oslo-qpeace-process&catid=1:fact-sheets&Itemid=9).

people. The period between the start of the peace process in September 1993 and the beginning of the Al-Aqsa uprising in September 2000 was a time of increasing and virtually uninterrupted economic decline for the majority of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip<sup>82</sup>. The continuation of preexisting structures of dependency and the introduction of new structures, particularly closure, exacerbated an already weakened economic base.

Although the Israeli government first imposed closure in early 1991, it became a permanent administrative measure in March 1993 in response to heightened violence by Palestinians against Israelis inside Israel<sup>83</sup>. Closure has since become an institutionalized system in the Gaza Strip and West Bank and, almost nine years after it was introduced, has never been lifted, although its intensity is subject to change.

Initially and most harshly imposed closure restricts the movement of people, labor, and goods, and has produced a double dissection, demographic and economic, of the occupied territories. Especially, demographically, closure has severed most movement between the West Bank and Gaza. By 1998, virtually all demographic (and commercial) interaction between the territories had ceased. Furthermore, closure has prohibited Palestinian access to Jerusalem. By early 1998, less than 4 percent of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip had permission to enter Jerusalem (and hence, Israel)<sup>84</sup>. As a result, Israel's closure policy physically has separated the northern and southern regions of the West Bank, whose primary road connections pass through Jerusalem.

Closure has three forms: general, total, and internal<sup>85</sup>. *General closure* refers to the overall restrictions placed on the movement of people, labor, goods, and the factors of production between the areas described earlier – it is typically accompanied by long delays at border crossings and by prolonged searches. *Total closure* refers to the complete banning of any movement between Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) and Israel and other foreign markets, and within Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza) – it is typically imposed in anticipation of or after a terrorist attack in Israel. *Internal closure* refers to restrictions on movement between Palestinian localities within the West Bank (and Gaza Strip) itself, and was made possible by the geographical canonization of the West Bank formalized in the Oslo II Accord.

Palestinian families have responded to economic distress in several ways. One has been an increase in child labor rates, particularly among children at 12 to 16 years of age. In 1999 the

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<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> Kumar, K., *Examining Oslo Peace Process: Rational for Failure*, Center for West Asian and North African Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University: New Delhi, 2007.

<sup>84</sup> Roy, S., *De-Development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society since Oslo*, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 3, Spring 1999.

<sup>85</sup> Kumar, K., *Examining Oslo Peace Process: Rational for Failure*, Center for West Asian and North African Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University: New Delhi, 2007.

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics found that 74 percent of working children under 18 years of age were not enrolled in school, and 73 percent worked in excess of 35 hours per week<sup>86</sup>.


Closure, in effect, is the method by which the Israeli policy of separation has been implemented – a policy that has historical antecedents in the British Mandate period. The idea of separating from the Palestinians physically and politically, and linked to them only economically in the form of cheap labor and captive export markets, was revived by, and underlines the substance and implementation of, the Oslo Accords<sup>87</sup>.

### 1.3 Al-Azaria, Abu Dees, and Al-Sawahra as Target Areas for the Survey

#### (1) Local Peculiarities as Area B in the Jerusalem Governorate

The definition of the boundaries of Jerusalem, which both Palestine and Israel proclaim as their capital, poses a particularly acute national, International and political problem for Palestinians, Israelis and the international community.

**Figure 1-1 Map of Jerusalem (Israel)**



Source: The New York Times, "Map of Settlements around Jerusalem" on Mar. 23, 2010, Retrieved on Dec. 5, 2012 from URL: <<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/03/23/world/middleeast/jerusalem-map.html>>.

<sup>86</sup> Dajani, S., *What Are the Terms of the Oslo "Peace Process,"* Retrieved on Sep. 26, 2012 from URL: <[http://tari.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=8:what-are-the-terms-of-the-oslo-qpeace-process&catid=1:fact-sheets&Itemid=9](http://tari.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8:what-are-the-terms-of-the-oslo-qpeace-process&catid=1:fact-sheets&Itemid=9)>.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

Conceptually, the core of this problem is the geographical understanding, legal mapping and claims of justified ownership associated with the boundaries of the city of Jerusalem. To Israelis, Jerusalem is the capital of the Jerusalem District, one of the 6 administrative districts of Israel. The Israeli government sees the municipal borders of Jerusalem as those borders established after the 1967 Six-Day War (see Figure 1-1). The area, surrounded by the Jerusalem city boundary on the map and referred to as Greater Jerusalem by the Israelis, includes “West Jerusalem” which has been under Israeli rule following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and “East Jerusalem” which is composed of the Old City and adjacent areas of the pre-1967 Jordanian control<sup>88</sup>.

Meanwhile, a new administrative division system has been introduced to the Palestinian territories after the Oslo Accords. The West Bank is divided into 11 governorates, including the Jerusalem Governorate, while Gaza into 5 governorates. The PA refers to, as J1 zone, the areas annexed by Israel in 1967, or East Jerusalem which is its proclaimed capital, and the rest of the Jerusalem Governorate as J2 zone<sup>89</sup> (see Figure 1-2).

The route of the security fence, excluding populated areas with Palestinians, does not exactly match the Israeli municipal boundary of Jerusalem (see Figure 1-3). Three villages, namely Abu Dees, Al-Azaria and Al-Sawahra Al-Sharqiya, which fall within J2 or the surrounding suburban areas of East Jerusalem, are just outside the Israeli boundary of Jerusalem and the security fence route as seen on the map.


The legal situation further complicates matters. In 1980, The Israeli Parliament enacted a law which defined Jerusalem as the “united and undivided” capital of Israel and its seat of political and legal governance but did not define the borders of this unified city. The international community does not recognize Israel’s claim that Jerusalem is unified and undivided. East Jerusalem and the adjacent lands assigned to the municipality are considered, like the rest of the West Bank, to be occupied territories that come under the jurisdiction of the Fourth Geneva Convention in 1949 which specifies that civilian populations will not be transferred into these lands and the Hague Regulations in 1907 which specify that any occupying force will adhere to the legal principles that were in place at the time of occupation. The Jewish neighborhoods built in Eastern Jerusalem following 1967 are considered to be illegal settlements that infringe on these international legal guidelines.

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<sup>88</sup> “East Jerusalem” usually refers to the parts of Jerusalem captured and annexed by Jordan after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and then by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War, including the Old City and some of the holy sites of three religions, namely Islam, Judaism, and Christianity.

<sup>89</sup> For more details, see the European Parliament, *Jerusalem: the Heart of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Policy Briefing)*, 2012 (<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/afet/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=76411>).

Figure 1-2 Map of the Jerusalem Governorate (Palestine)




Source: PCBS, *Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook* 2012 ([http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/\\_PCBS/Downloads/book1891.pdf](http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1891.pdf)).

In 2002 the Israel government in a unilateral move decided to build what it describes as a “security fence” to protect the civilian population of Israel from attacks by suicide bombers from the West Bank. In 2003 this plan was put into action with the aim of constructing 720 kilometers of a fence that basically encloses the whole of the occupied West Bank<sup>90</sup>. The fence consists of 6 meters high concrete slabs, a new road for motorized patrol on the Israeli side, a barbed wire fence insulating the road from the surroundings creating a “sterile” area and a series of guard posts and watch towers.

Following international understandings and agreements concerning the legitimate borders of Israel based on the 1949 ceasefire lines (termed the Green Line), one might have supposed that as a security fence the built barrier would closely follow the Green Line. But the contours of the fence do not follow the Green Line but rather intrude several kilometers into West Bank territory and more disturbingly, as in the case of Abu Dis, crisscross through and around several Palestinian towns and villages. Nowadays, traveling between the northern and southern parts of the West Bank involves time-consuming and costly detours around East Jerusalem. Prior to September 2000, traveling through East Jerusalem was the most direct and widely used route between the southern and northern West Bank.

<sup>90</sup> Le Bars, S. and Van Renterghen, M., *Walking the Wall*, Index on Censorship 3/2004.

Figure 1-3 Map of Jerusalem – Locations of Three Villages



Source: Ir Amir, *Greater Jerusalem 2009*, Retrieved on Dec. 5, 2012 from URL: [http://eng.ir-amim.org.il/\\_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/GreaterJerusalem2009Eng.JPG](http://eng.ir-amim.org.il/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/GreaterJerusalem2009Eng.JPG).  
 Notes: Three villages are indicated in different spelling. The area indicated as E1 is Mevasseret Adumim, a new neighborhood under development by the Israeli authorities.

Since the construction of the fence, many Palestinian villages and towns have been fully or partially enclosed on the Israeli side of the fence with hundreds of thousands of Palestinian residents being taken in the Israeli side of a barrier so that, paradoxically, they have been forbidden to cross the borders<sup>91</sup>. The difficulties for these West Bank residents living on the Israeli side of the fence has been well documented and consists of problems in relation to the interference with economic issues such as farming, work access and retail sales; educational issues such as access to schools; and health issues such as access to doctors, clinics and hospitals; and of course the basic right of communion with family members<sup>92</sup>. It is said that the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem face multiple forms of discrimination. These West Bank citizens are in an impossible situation of being located within Israel without any legal status but physically separated from the West Bank. Israeli authorities have defined these areas as military closed enclaves, making life of these West Bank residents extremely difficult. Israel seems to have made tremendous efforts to reduce the number of Palestinians living and working in East Jerusalem, which is apparently and steadily isolating the area from the rest of the West Bank.

Due to the eased movement restrictions in the West Bank by the Israeli authorities and better access of Palestinians in Israel to the West Bank market, as well as a recent improvement in the security environment in the West Bank through the efforts of both the PA and Israel, investors' confidence has been increased and more economic activities have been observed among the Arab citizens of Israel. However, their access to the markets in the West Bank and Gaza as well as in Israel and other countries is still severely limited<sup>93</sup>.

The Israeli Government has announced that it will continue the expansion of settlements in East Jerusalem, despite the protests by human rights organizations and the international community<sup>94</sup>. The combination of the security fence, Israeli settlements, permit restrictions and physical obstacles helps further separate East Jerusalem from the West Bank. This entire situation undermines not only the possibility of the Palestinians to use natural resources for the benefit of the Palestinian economy, but also the role of East Jerusalem as a centre for economy, education, health and other services for residents in the West Bank. Movement between East Jerusalem and the West Bank is obviously crucial for future socio-economic and political development in Palestine.

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<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> WHO, *Health Conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, and in the Occupied Syrian Golan*, May 2010 ([http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf\\_files/WHA63/A63\\_28-en.pdf](http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA63/A63_28-en.pdf)).

<sup>94</sup> Haaretz, "Netanyahu: Israel Will Keep Building in Jerusalem" on 15 Mar., 2010, Retrieved on Nov. 30, 2012 from URL: <[www.haaretz.com/news/netanyahu-israel-will-keep-building-in-jerusalem-1.264791](http://www.haaretz.com/news/netanyahu-israel-will-keep-building-in-jerusalem-1.264791)>.

The problem of signification in relation to this fence is best exemplified by the differences in linguistic marking assigned to this physical entity. As specified by Rogers and Ben-David<sup>95</sup> in an analysis of media and web-based usage of terminology, the “security fence” called by Israeli officials is alternatively named the “apartheid wall” by Palestinian officials, and the “separation wall” in international discussions. The various designations of the wall reflect the ways in which the meaning of the wall is constructed within national discourses on each side and within the international realm. The problems associated with the construction of this wall were fully internationalized in 2003, when the UN General Assembly in resolution ES-10/14 requested the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague to explore the legal ramifications of the construction of this wall. In 2004 the ICJ determined that “...*the construction of the wall by Israel in the occupied Palestinian Territories is contrary to international law*” and that Israel should dismantle the wall<sup>96</sup>. The ICJ further expressed the fear that the wall was not a temporary structure as claimed by the Israeli government but rather a stage in a process of land acquisition – a form of *de facto* annexation. The Israel government describes the wall as a measure designed for the defense of its citizens and necessary to keep terrorists out of Israel, whereas the PA situates the meaning of the wall within the conceptual frame of a series of measures that are ultimately designed to annex land and lead to demographic changes in favor of the Jewish population<sup>97</sup>.

The later interpretation is elaborately argued through the theory of the “Matrix of Control”<sup>98</sup> which argues that Israel’s control and occupation of the Palestinian West Bank is hidden within a complex bureaucratic structure of laws, orders and administrative procedures. Each single part of the Matrix of Control including the presence of the wall can be argued by Israel in utilitarian terms of required administrative policy, but taken as a totality, the collection of policies and practices represents a repressive construct designed to leave the Palestinians without the possibility of self determination and as a dependent entity.

Thus, the wall in Abu Dis sits uncomfortable at the nexus of several powerful and competing discourses produced by a range of political actors. For the Israeli Government the wall is

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<sup>95</sup> Rogers, R. and Ben-David, A., *Coming to Terms. A Conflict Analysis of the Usage, in Official and Unofficial Sources, of “Security Fence,” “Apartheid Wall,” and Other Terms for the Structure between Israel and the Palestinian Territories*, Issuenetwork, Govcom.org Foundation: Amsterdam, 2005, ([http://www.govcom.org/publications/full\\_list/ben-david\\_rogers\\_coming\\_to\\_terms\\_2oct.pdf](http://www.govcom.org/publications/full_list/ben-david_rogers_coming_to_terms_2oct.pdf)).

<sup>96</sup> The UN General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/ES-10/14) “*Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory*,” adopted on 8 December, 2003 (<http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/F953B744269B9B7485256E1500776DCA>).

<sup>97</sup> Khamaisi, R. and Nasrallah, R., *The Jerusalem Urban Fabric*, International Peace and Cooperation Center: Jerusalem, 2003.

<sup>98</sup> Halper, J., *The Matrix of Control*, 2001, Retrieved on Sep. 26, 2012 from URL: <<http://www.mediamonitors.net/halper1.html>>.

conceptualized as a defensive measure against terrorism and as such is part of a much larger national and international discourse on fighting terrorism. The same discourse from a national perspective situates Israel as the victim of violence against civilians and justifies the wall through the construct of the government's main role as defending civilians against attack. Furthermore, the concept of Israel as a victim comprises the history of anti-Semitism with obvious references to the tragedy of the Holocaust, a narrative that is often used within Israeli public discourse to justify the whole existence of the Israeli state.

For the PA, the wall is a further evidence of a system of oppression by an occupying army that aims to annex land and direct demographic changes and thus, is part of the discourse of the occupation and annexation. Explicitly through the term "apartheid," the official Palestinian discourse situates the wall and the Israeli occupation as a policy of segregation. From an international perspective the wall is situated within the legal discourse of international relations and termed an illegal separation wall.

## **(2) Characteristics of Each Area**

The three target villages, namely Al-Azaria, Abu Dis, and Al-Sawahra are located on the eastern outskirts of Jerusalem, approximately two kilometers from the Old City. Brief introductions to three villages are as follows.

### **1) Al-Azaria**

According to PCBS's latest statistics, Al-Azaria is a place of dwelling for 18,785<sup>99</sup> residents, most of whom are from different backgrounds (i.e. Hebron, Jerusalem, Bedouins and Christians. Christians occupy about 3 percent of the population, and it was estimated that there were 550 Christians in 2007<sup>100</sup>.

After the complete seal of this village, the access to services were highly diminished since the center of life was Jerusalem. Most of the health facilities were newly established but still at a very small scale. The village has 4 public and one private schools. Some say in general public schools still offer very low quality of education as they face high demands because of the increasing influx of people coming to the village. Also, violence often interrupts the scholastic days and creates fracture within community as intolerance is increasing among community.

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<sup>99</sup> This figure is an estimated population in 2011 (PCBS, *Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook 2012* ([http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/\\_PCBS/Downloads/book1891.pdf](http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1891.pdf))).

<sup>100</sup> Collings, Al-Qass, R., Kassis, R. O., and Raheb, M., *Palestinian Christians: Facts, Figures and Trends 2008*. Diyar: Bethlehem, 2009 (<http://ja.scribd.com/doc/24692089/Palestine-Christians-2008-Facts-Figures>).

## **2) Abu Dis**

The village lies between Al-Azaria in the North and Al-Sawahra in the South. The Israeli settlement of Maale Adumin borders Abu Dis on the eastern side. Because of its proximity to Jerusalem, the importance of Abu Dis had greatly increased compared to before the construction of the wall. Even the establishment of three checkpoints around the locality did not prevent – although certainly restricted and delayed – access to, through or from Abu Dis over the past three years. In fact, almost all PA offices dealing with Jerusalem affairs and suburbs-related issues are located in Abu Dis.

The village has 3 public, one private and one UNRWA schools. Furthermore, about 13,000 students receive their higher education at Al-Quds University campus in the village. In general, the local population of 11,504<sup>101</sup> almost doubles for the daily influx of students and employees who commute from their place of residence. An average number of 150 to 200 Ford Transit services daily transport students to the University from different localities.

Being on the only way which connects Ramallah and other northern towns with the southern West Bank, the local council chairperson estimates that 50,000 vehicles pass daily through Abu Dis, heading towards Bethlehem and Jericho, and that 10,000 additional people (students and employees) live in or commute to the village. There are 1,100 refugees (250 families), and there is one UNRWA Girls School, attended by 618 students (most of who reside in the locality), and where 21 teachers work.

Construction of the wall in Abu Dis started in mid-2003. Originally concrete blocks were placed in the locality. At the early stages of wall construction, the access time to Jerusalem from Abu Dis increased from 10 minutes to more than one hour.

Al-Quds University has also been seriously affected by the wall construction. The increased costs of transportation to Abu Dees will make attendance unaffordable to students. As mentioned earlier, the great majority of the students are not local residents.

Prior to construction of the barrier and up to now, Abu Dis residents were required to hold two permits: one enables them to enter Jerusalem, and the other allowing them to travel through the West Bank (checkpoint permit). The future evolution of the permits policy is still not clear yet.

## **3) Al-Sawahra**

Al-Sawahra is the Bedouin community of Jerusalem, divided into two areas by the wall – Al-Sawahra Al-Sharqiya is east side (same as Al-Azaria and Abu Dis) whereas Al-Sawahra Al-

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<sup>101</sup> This figure is an estimated population in 2011 (PCBS, *Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook 2012* ([http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/\\_PCBS/Downloads/book1891.pdf](http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1891.pdf))).

Gharbiya is west side<sup>102</sup>. Al-Sawahra Al-Sharqiya is a village of 6,188 dwellers<sup>103</sup>, and it has two public schools that provide education for most of the young inhabitants of the village.

There is a very long history of animosity between Abu Dis and Al-Sawahra which has led to the loss of many lives, affected the way of life of people in both communities, and also interrupted education process in the university. The roots of this social issue are not clearly known. Every now and then residents from Abu Dees and Al-Sawahra get into serious fighting, and informal mediation have been regularly introduced however ended up being fruitless.

### **(3) Socio-Economic Issues in the Target Areas**

Jerusalem residents used to visit and shop in the target villages where commodity prices were generally lower than in downtown Jerusalem. Local shops used to highly depend on Jerusalem clients for earning incomes. An enhancement in commercial activities also resulted from the influx of employees, students and commuters in general. Furthermore, in Abu Dis where Al-Quds University is located, renting houses to students had become an important source of income. Consequently, the price of land in Abu Dis had been increasing as high as JD 40,000 per dunam until April 2003<sup>104</sup>.

Construction of the wall dramatically reversed this trend, and has resulted in a marked impoverishment and disenfranchisement of these three villages. Land has depreciated by 60 percent and people started to move out. As of January 2004, the local authority reported that approximately 1,000 people moved or applied for residence transfer<sup>105</sup>. Those who could, tried to move to Jerusalem, although there they could only afford to live in overcrowded and poor conditions. Others planned to move to Bethlehem. Shops were closing down and unemployment rates were strongly increasing. House rents have decreased by 30 percent and the cost of public transport from Abu Dis to Damascus Gate in Jerusalem has increased from NIS 1-1.5 to NIS 7, and the taxi fare has risen from NIS 2.5 to NIS 10.

The local authority also reports that 90 percent of the land which has been confiscated to allow construction of the wall (800 dunams) was agricultural land. However, so far, no major change has been recorded in the price of agricultural products sold in the villages. Many Abu Dis

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<sup>102</sup> Al-Sawahra Al-Gharbiya is not included in the target areas for the survey since KnK Japan's project targets mainly Al-Sawahra Al-Sharqiya due to geographical restrictions caused by the wall.

<sup>103</sup> This figure is an estimated population in 2011 (PCBS, *Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook 2012* ([http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/\\_PCBS/Downloads/book1891.pdf](http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1891.pdf))).

<sup>104</sup> *Dunam* is "...a unit of land measurement dating back to the Ottoman Empire (and) still used today as a measure of real estate in the Levant, including in Palestine/Israel, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, but it has varying values" (Tristram, P., *Dunam or Dunum*, Retrieved on Sep. 26, 2012 from URL: <<http://middleeast.about.com/od/glossary/g/dunum-dunam.htm>>).

<sup>105</sup> UNRWA, *Abu Dis, East Jerusalem*, 2004 (<http://www.nad-plo.org/userfiles/file/Reports/unreport1.pdf>).

residents, for example, raise livestock and grazing land is also becoming scarce, as the village is now wedged between the wall and Maale Adumim settlement. At present, approximately 50 residents own more than 20 farm animals and two people own more than 300 in the village<sup>106</sup>.

Some internal tension was felt in the community, when Israeli contractors working on the wall started hiring workers from the Hebron area. They were requested to work at night for NIS 500 per night, according to local rumors. The local authority reports that youth activists chased them and forced them to leave work. In addition, local activists sometimes attempt to slow down advancement in the construction work – e.g. by the occasional burning of or damage to construction machines.

The socio-political conditions have affected the education sector in the target areas. Beyond logistical problems of access, and consequent loss of school days, proximity to the wall site in the three areas is likely to have a psychologically disruptive effect on all students and teachers alike. This is obviously affecting both UNRWA and PA schools (elementary and secondary).

The community currently feels helpless and disillusioned, despite the numerous visits of activists and international organizations to the wall sites.

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<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

## **Chapter 2 Framework of the Research**

### **2.1 Objectives**

The main purpose of this research is to better understand life and education environment surrounding children and youths in the target areas, namely Al-Azaria, Abu Dis and Al-Sawahra Al-Sharqiya in Jerusalem Governorate in the West Bank. This research is part of an exploratory effort to understand the socio-economic factors affecting the households in addition to evaluating educational services provided in these areas, with a view to reassessing the needs of children and youths in education and utilizing survey results for improving the quality of the project by redesigning it after the end of the first year. Another important objective of conducting this research is to draw attention from the public, including in Palestine and Japan, about the current situations of Palestinian children and youths through the publication of the survey results.

### **2.2 Research Designs and Methodology**

This entire research was implemented for a total of 9 months from January to September 2012. First, relevant literature was collected and reviewed in order to understand the general life situations such as the living standards of households, education environment and employment as well as socio-economic and political conditions in the West Bank, especially focusing on Jerusalem Governorate as the main target. Second, field survey strategies and plans were made and refined, such as elaborating survey objectives, defining survey targets, determining survey methods to apply, making survey schedule, etc. Accordingly, a team of 10 members, including 4 staff members from KnK in Palestine and 6 field researchers from Al-Quds University were composed for this research.

During the 4 months of February to May 2012, 6 field researchers, after instructed social survey methods, visited homes in the three villages under the direct supervision of a faculty staff member at Al-Quds University as Researcher of KnK in Palestine. House visits were organized, based on clustering the villages into neighborhoods with the application of an arbitrary sampling method.

The field researchers interviewed families with a pre-established questionnaire in Arabic as an instrument for this survey. The questionnaire consisted of 32 questions grouped into 5 sections such as: 1) respondents' demographic information; 2) their living standards; 3) education environment surrounding youths; 4) their life after education; and 5) influences on respondents' life derived from socio-political conditions. The questionnaire contained various

types of questions using either likert scale, multiple-choice with/without numeric values, or open-ended questions, depending on the nature of question although without any sort of induction.

Questions were formulated in a best possible way that would enable the research team to grasp the situations of target households in an objective manner. A great deal of caution was paid for the issues of ethics, socio-cultural taboos and politics in formulating questions. The questionnaire was revised after a pilot test at an initial stage. The questionnaire also included an observational part where interviewees could record their impressions about the home visit or the respondents, which would help understand their responses from a different perspective and thus ensure more credibility in the data obtained. The data was recorded by the field researchers, and processed statistically and anonymously for analysis by other team members at a later stage.

### 2.3 Survey Targets

The survey targets are households with children and youths at the age of 22 years and below<sup>107</sup> in the three villages. The survey team went to visit a total of more than 300 households in the three villages during the 4-month period of implementing surveys, however the team could obtain valid responses from only 172 households, including 55 from Al-Azaria, 63 from Abu Dis and 54 from Al-Sawahra Al-Sharqiya respectively (Table 2-1). These 172 households include 16 in Al-Azaria and 4 in Abu Dis whose children were registered with KnK's youth center at the time of the survey.

According to the statistics in 2010, the total number of residents in the three villages is estimated to be about 35,000 (or 6,055 housing units) including 18,450 (or 3,088 housing units) in Al-Azaria, 11,290 (or 1,997 housing units) in Abu Dis and 6,070 (or 970 housing units) in Al-Sawahra Al-Sharqiya<sup>108</sup>. It is estimated that half of the population in the three target areas, about 17,500, is at the age of 20 years and below<sup>109</sup>.

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<sup>107</sup> In this report, *children and youths* hereinafter refer to those who are at the age of 22 years and below.

<sup>108</sup> Palestinian National Authority (PNA), *Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook No. 13*, 2011. Housing Unit refers to "...a building or part of a building constructed for one household only" (*Ibid.*).

<sup>109</sup> Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS), *Press Release, May 21<sup>st</sup> 2012*. The median age, an age that half of the population is below and the other half of the population is above, is 20 years in the Arab population in Jerusalem areas in 2010 (*Ibid.*).

**Table 2-1 Demographic Data on Survey Target Villages**

	Survey Target Villages			Total
	Al-Azaria	Abu Dis	Al-Sawahra Al Shargiya	
<b>Residents (estimated in 2010)</b>	18,450	11,290	6,070	35,810
<b>Housing Units</b>	3,088	1,997	970	6,055
<b>Survey Target Households</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>172</b>
<b>Residents within Target Households</b>	313	380	378	1,071
<b>Children and Youths (6 - 22 years of age)</b>	163	173	166	502
<b>Younger Children (5 Years and below)</b>	44	87	106	237

(Source) Indicated in the footnotes.

The 172 households targeted for this survey, about 3 percent of the entire households of the target areas, are composed of a total of 1,071 persons including 502 children and youths between 6 and 22 years of age as the main target age range for KnK's project, and 238 younger children at the age of 5 years and below. Meanwhile, the population of the Jerusalem Governorate where the three villages are located and excluding the part annexed by Israel in 1967 is estimated to be 144,740 (or 23,190 housing units) in 2010<sup>110</sup>.


<sup>110</sup> PNA, *Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook No. 13*, 2011.

## Chapter 3 Results of the Survey

This chapter presents new findings and statistical data on survey target households and their members, such as: 1) socio-economic conditions and demographic data as background information; 2) influences from socio-political conditions on children; 3) living standards of children and their families; 4) educational environment surrounding children; and 5) children's life after education.


### 3.1 Socio-Economic Conditions of Survey Target Households

**Table 3-1-1 Religion**




With regards to religion, among a total of 172 households targeted in the survey, 156 households are Muslim, and only one household in Al-Azaria is Christian (while no response from 15 households). This corresponds to the fact that about 3 percent of the population is Christian in Al-Azaria whereas much less in Abu Dis and Al-Sawahra, as mentioned in Chapter 1.

**Table 3-1-2 Length of residence**




Regarding the length of residence in the target villages, 31 among the 172 households respond they live in their village for less than 10 years; 45 for more than 10 years but less than 20 years; 39 over 20 years; and 37 for their lifetime (20 non-responses).

**Table 3-1-3 Place of Origin**




Four thirds of the entire target populations (129 among the 172 households) in the three villages respond they are either from Al-Azaria (31 responses), Abu Dis (49) or Al-Sawahra (49). 35 households respond they are of different origins (8 non-responses).

**Table 3-1-4 Change of Residence**




124 among the 172 households in the three villages respond they reside in their place of origin, while 40 respond they do not (8 non-responses). The difference with the number of household (129) in Table 3-1-3 seems to be explained that 5 households, or about 3 percent, have changed their residence to another village within the three target villages.

**Table 3-1-5 Reason for Change**



Among the 40 households that respond they do not reside in their place of origin (Table 3-1-4) or, in other words, have changed their residence to either of the target three villages from elsewhere, 11 households respond they did so for marriage; 10 for job-related reasons; 9 for socio-political reasons; and 3 for other reasons (7 non-responses).

**Table 3-1-6 Number of Household Members**



**Table 3-1-7 Number of Children and Youths in the Household**




Table 3-1-6 shows the number of family members in the household. The most typical among the target 172 households is a household of 7 members (32 responses), followed by those of 6 members (29), 5 members (24), 4 members (21), 3 members (20), etc. 10 households have more than 10 members. The average size of the 170 households (excluding the two non-responses) is 6.3 members in the household.

Table 3-1-7 shows the number of children and youths who aged 22 and below in the household. Most typical among the target 172 households is a household of 5 children and youths (33 responses) and that of 4 children and youths (32). Also, many households have 6, 3 or 2 children and youths. 21 households (12.2% of the total) have only a single child or youth, whereas 3 households (1.7%) have more than 10 children and youths. The average number of children and youths among the 172 households is 4.3 persons in the household, including 2.8 between 6 and 22 years of age and 1.5 at the age of 5 years and below (see Table 2.1).

**Table 3-1-8 Number, Age and Gender Ratio**





Table 3-1-8 shows the numbers, ages and gender ratio of the 499 children and youths between 6 and 22 years of age (not including 3 persons whose data is incomplete) in the 172 households. Among the 499 persons, 283 are males (57%) and 216 are females (43%).


Based on these statistics, it can be said that the typical household with at least one member 22 years old and below in the target areas is Muslim (91%), originated from its village (75%), keeping its residence for more than 20 years (77%), composed of 6.3 family members including 2 adults, and 4.3 children and youths of whom 2.8 persons are between 6 and 22 years of age.

### 3.2 Influences of Socio-Political Conditions on Children

**Table 3-2-1 Influence on Children by Checkpoints/Investigations I**



**Table 3-2-2 Influence on Children by Checkpoints/Investigation II**




68 households (39%) among the 172 households respond that some influences are observed in children due to the existence of checkpoints and investigations by the Israeli

authority whereas 41 households (24%) respond there is no such influence on children. It should be noted that 63 households (37%) do not respond to this question.

Responses from the 68 households include: some negative psychological influences such as fear, anxiety, annoyance, depression, aggressiveness and loss of concentration (39 responses); financial burdens incurred by traveling through checkpoints (8); restrictions from movement (7); delay in traveling or commute (6); burdens by administrative inspections and procedures (5); and difficulties in understanding the situations and asking many questions to their families (2).

**Table 3-2-3 Access to Jerusalem**




37 households (22%) among the 172 households respond one or more family members including children in the household have regular access to Jerusalem, whereas 128 households (74%) respond no one in the household does (7 non-responses). The 37 households having access to Jerusalem include 12 from Al-Azaria, 9 from Abu Dis and 16 from Al-Sawahra.

Based on the data as shown above, it can be said that: 1) many of the target households, except for one-fifth do not have any family member who has regular access to Jerusalem; and 2) at least one-third of the target households recognize some negative influences not only on children but the entire household (e.g. financial burdens, restrictions for movement, etc.) caused by the existence of checkpoints and investigations by the Israeli authority.


### 3.3 Living Standards of Children and Their Families

**Table 3-3-1 Ownership of Property**



Among the 172 households, 125 (73%) own their house; 12 (7%) own their apartment; 7 (4%) rent their house; and 26 (15%) rent their apartment (2 non-responses). In other words, 80 percent of the target households own their place. This data seems to not contradict with that of the number of years of living (Table 3-1-2) and of the place of origin (Table 3-1-3).


**Table 3-3-2 Number of Rooms**



Most of the 172 households respond there are 2 bedrooms (42%) or 3 bedrooms (44%) in their house; there is only one bedroom in 14 households (8%) while there are 4 bedrooms in 7 households (4%) (3 non-responses). Also, most of the 172 households respond there is 1 bathroom (54%) or 2 bathrooms (43%) in their house, except for one household with 4 bathrooms in their house (4 non-responses).


The average numbers of bedrooms and bathrooms in the target households excluding non-responses are 2.6 and 1.6 respectively.

**Table 3-3-3 Availability of Utilities**




Most of the 172 households respond water and electricity are available at their dwellings. Except for one non-response household in Al-Azaria. Regarding to the availability of both water and electricity, water is available at all the target households whereas electricity is unavailable at one household in Al-Sawahra.

**Table 3-3-4 Main Breadwinner in the Household**



Among the 172 households, the main breadwinner is father in 152 households (88%); mother in 2 (1.2%); both father and mother in 7 (4.1%); father and relative in 1 (0.6%); father and offspring in 3 (1.8%); and offspring in 3 (1.8%) (4 non-responses).


**Table 3-3-5 Profession of the Breadwinner**



The most typical profession of the breadwinners of the 172 households is blue-collar worker (104 persons (57%)) including construction worker, factory worker, farmer, guard, carpenter, driver, cleaner, etc.; 54 (30%) are white-collar worker such as professor, teacher, doctor, lawyer, banker, etc.; 8 (4%) are service workers such as in restaurant business and retailer; and 4 are unemployed at the time of survey (13 non-responses).

Professions of mothers as breadwinners in the target households include school principal, teacher, member of the university personnel, nurse and social worker, while those of the offspring as breadwinners all consist in manual labor.

**Table 3-3-6 Average Monthly Income Level**



Among the 172 households, the most widespread average monthly income is between 2,500 and 4,000 NIS/month (or between 625 and 1,000 USD/month approximately) with 64 households (37%), followed by the category between 1,500 and 2,500 NIS/month with 44 households (26%). 31 households (18%) respond that their average monthly income level is less than 1,500 NIS/month, while 23 (13%) earn between 4,000 and 7,000 NIS/month, and 5 (3%) more than 7,000 NIS/month in average (5 non-responses).

**Table 3-3-7 Comparison of Average Monthly Income depending on Access to Jerusalem**




Table 3-3-7 shows a comparison of the average monthly incomes between households with access (36 responses) and those without access (125) to Jerusalem (excluding non-responses). Households with access to Jerusalem occupy higher percentages in the higher average monthly incomes – 42 percent for the monthly income between 2,500 and 4,000 NIS/month (38 percent for those without access); 19 percent for the monthly income between 4,000 and 7,000 NIS/month (14 percent for those without access); and 3 percent for the monthly income more

than 7,000 NIS/month (2 percent for those without access). In the meantime, almost half of the households without access to Jerusalem earn the monthly income less than 2,500 NIS/month (or 625 USD/month approximately), including those earning the monthly income less than 1,500 NIS/month (or 375 USD/month approximately) (20 percent of the entire households without access).

**Table 3-3-8 Comparison of Average Monthly Income among Three Target Villages**





Table 3-3-8 shows a comparison of the average monthly incomes among households in the three villages. Households in Al-Azaria occupy higher percentages in the higher average monthly incomes (e.g. 11 percent for the monthly income between 4,000 and 7,000 NIS/month), while those in Al-Sawahra occupy higher percentages in the lower monthly incomes (e.g. 19 percent for the monthly income less than 1,500 NIS/month).

**Table 3-3-9 Financial Support from Abroad**




Among the 172 households, one responds they receive financial support from their families who live abroad whereas 168 respond they do not receive any support from abroad (3 non-responses).

Based on these statistics, it can be said that: 1) the typical household of 6.3 family members usually lives in an owned house (73%) or a rented apartment (15%) composed of 2.6 bedrooms and 1.6 bathrooms, equipped with both water and electricity; 2) the main breadwinner of the typical household is only the father (88%), or father with either mother, relative or offspring (6.5%), and his profession is mainly blue-collar work (57%), or otherwise white-collar work (30%) or work in the service sector (4%); 3) the typical household earns an amount between 2,500 and 4,000 NIS/month (37%) or between 1,500 and 2,500 NIS/month (26%) in average, and do not receive any financial support from any family member living abroad (98%); 4) there seems to be a correlation between the income level and access to Jerusalem, and the household with access generally earns a higher income than that without access to Jerusalem – i.e. access to Jerusalem seems to highly affect the living standards of households in the target villages; and 5) the average income of households in Al-Azaria is the highest and those in Al-Sawahra is the lowest among the three target villages.


### 3.4 Education Environment surrounding Children

**Table 3-4-1 Education Level and Number of Attendees**




Among the 480 persons between 6 and 22 years of age who attend school in the target households, 426 (89%) go to primary and secondary schools; 37 (8%) go to university or college, and one goes to a special school for the hearing-impaired (16 non-responses).

**Table 3-4-2 Type of School in Primary and Secondary Education**




Among the 426 persons between 6 and 22 years of age who attend school in the target households, 263 (62%) go to government schools, 90 (21%) go to private schools, and 73 (17%) go to UNRWA school in the region.

**Table 3-4-3 Satisfaction with School**




123 (72%) among the 172 households in the three villages respond their children enjoy school, whereas 38 (22%) respond their children do not enjoy school (11 non-responses).

**Table 3-4-4 Reason for Dissatisfaction with School**




Children in these 38 households do not enjoy school for various reasons. Some do not like to go to school in general (10 responses); some do not like studying (4); some do not like the school teachers (3); some do not like the school atmosphere or environment (2); and one household responded their children do not like to go through the checkpoint (16 non-responses).

**Table 3-4-5 Satisfaction with Education**




Two-thirds of the 172 households in the three villages respond they are satisfied with the education provided at school whereas 35 (20%) respond they are not (11 neutral; 12 non-responses).

**Table 3-4-6 Reason for Dissatisfaction with Education**




The main reasons for which 35 households are not satisfied with education provided at school include as follows: the quality of teaching is low (13 responses); there is no encouragement for students by teachers (10); the teaching methods applied are ineffective (8); and there is no discipline in education at school (3) (6 non-responses).

**Table 3-4-7 Views on Teaching Methods**




In comparison with Table 3-4-6, there is a larger number of households (49) that respond teaching methods at school are inappropriate when asked about their views specifically, although 107 (62%) feel teaching methods are appropriate (12 non-responses).

**Table 3-4-8 Reason for Dissatisfaction with Teaching Methods**




The main reasons for which 49 households are not satisfied with the teaching methods applied at school are as follows: teaching methods are old-fashioned (24 responses); not adequate (6); and teachers' negligence of children's educational needs. (3) (18 non-responses).

**Table 3-4-9 Concerns about Education Environment**




More than half of the 172 households in the three villages respond they are concerned with their children’s educational environment, although 75 households (44%) respond they are not (10 non-responses).

**Table 3-4-10 Specific Concerns about Education Environment**




The main concerns of the 87 households with the educational environment are as follows: their children acquire improper habits from others such as smoking, drugs, fighting, skipping classes (38 responses); overcrowding (14); unstable political conditions (9); unsafe school commute (7); low educational quality (2); and high tuition fees (2) (18 non-responses).

**Table 3-4-11 Consultation about Concerns I**




50 households (29%) respond they have consulted with other people about their concerns, whereas 104 (60%) respond they have not (18 non-responses).

**Table 3-4-12 Consultation about Concerns II**




Among the 50 households that have had a consultation about their concerns, 16 have consulted with their school principal; 16 with a social worker; 10 with a teacher; 2 with the parents' council; and 2 with other parents (4 non-responses). After the consultation, 2 households felt the issue was solved; 14 had positive, 2 negative, and 8 no special reactions from the people consulted (24 non-responses.)

**Table 3-4-13 Supportive Environment for Education**




**Table 3-4-14 Hindering Factors**




Almost half of the 172 households respond the surrounding environment supports their children's education whereas another almost half respond it does not (9 non-responses). Hindering factors pointed out by the 83 households include unstable political conditions (13), no institution supporting children's talents (11), neighbors' nuisance (8), etc.

**Table 3-4-15 Failing Grades in School by Children**




**Table 3-4-16 Subjects Failed by Children**




30 households (17%) among the 172 households respond their children have poor grades in school whereas 130 (76%) respond their children have not (12 non-responses). Amongst the 30 households, many children have failed in English and mathematics (18 households respectively), some in Arabic and religion (4 respectively), and science (3) and information technology (1).

**Table 3-4-17 Behavioral Issues in Children in School**




**Table 3-4-18 Specific Behavioral Issues in Children**




32 households (19%) among the 172 households respond some behavioral issues in their children have been reported or observed while in school whereas 129 (75%) respond this was not the case (11 non-responses). According to the 32 households, those behavioral issues include fighting with other students (20 responses); fighting with teachers (4); restless behavior (3); and careless or slovenly behavior (1) (4 non-responses).

**Table 3-4-19 Average Number of Study Hours/Week outside School**



**Table 3-4-20 Study Helper at Home**




Many households respond their children spend their time studying outside school. Most children spend either less than 6 hours (37 responses or 22%), 6 to 12 hours (32 responses or 19%), or 12 to 18 hours (49 responses or 28%) per week in average outside school. Meanwhile, there are some children who spend more time studying, such as 18 to 24 hours (15 responses or 9%), 24 to 30 hours (9 responses or 5%), and more than 30 hours (8) per week in average outside school (22 non-responses).

In most cases, children study at home with the help of their families, and it is usually their mother (99 responses) who helps them. Otherwise, it is father (18), sister (6), brother (3), relative (3), or grandparent (2). There are very few children who have a private tutor (2 responses) or who are supported by their classmate (1). Meanwhile, quite a few children study on their own (44).

**Table 3-4-21 Participation in Extracurricular Activities**


		<i>outside school</i>		
		yes	no	non-response
<i>at school</i>	yes	21	29	0
	no	27	78	0
	non-response	0	0	17

**Table 3-4-22 Extracurricular Activities outside School**




Among the 172 households, children from 21 households (12%) participate in extracurricular activities both at and outside school; 56 (33%) do either at or outside school; and 78 (45%) do not participate in such activities at all (17 non-responses). Among the 48 households who respond their children participate in extracurricular activities outside school, children in 13 households (27%) take part in activities at KnK’s youth center in Azaria at the time of the survey. Types of extracurricular activities in which those children participate outside school include sports, scouts, dabka (traditional dance), arts, theater, etc.

**Table 3-4-23 Using Educational Services at Al-Quds University**



**Table 3-4-24 Types of Services Used at Al-Quds University**



30 (17%) among the 172 households respond they have used educational services at Al-Quds university (5 non-responses). Amongst the 30 households, 17 respond their children attend degree courses at the university while 3 respond they have used different types of services such as receiving financial support, attending exhibitions, etc. (10 non-responses). In the 17 households, 22 offspring are current students at and 2 are recent graduates from the university at the time of the surveys. 22 of the 37 university and college students in the 172 households (59%) go to Al-Quds university.

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
Based on these statistics, it can be said that: 1) among those who attend school, although some go to university or college (8%) many of whom attend Al-Quds University in Abu Dis, most children and youths learn at the primary and secondary levels (89%), of whom the majority go to public school (62%) whereas about one-fifth goes to private school (21%) and UNRWA school (17%) respectively; 2) about three-fourths of those attending school are satisfied with their school, two-thirds of the parents and guardians are satisfied with the education provided, and the majority of them consider teaching methods at school as appropriate; and 3) more than half of them are concerned with their children’s education environment, however only less than one-

third of the entire households have consulted with other people about those concerns – in fact, almost half of them believe the surrounding environment supports their children’s education whereas another almost half do not share such views.

Regarding the children, it is inferred that: 4) in general, children are studying and behaving well at school, except for less than one-fifth of the total who have failed grades in school, and those, also less than one-fifth whose behavioral issues have been reported or observed while in school; 5) most children spend their time studying outside school and usually supported by their mother at home, but the number of hours per week they spend for their studies varies, and the most common response was 12 to 18 hours (28%) followed by less than 6 hours (22%), 6 to 12 hours (19%), 18 to 24 hours (9%), etc.; and 6) almost half of the children participate in extracurricular activities either at or outside school, whereas another almost half of them do not participate in such activities at all.

### 3-5 Life of Children after Education

**Table 3-5-1 Number, Age and Gender Ratio of Children out of School**




Among the 172 households, there are 19 children and youths (14 males and 5 females) who do not attend school. They are at the age of 16 years and above, except for one male at the age of 12 who is handicapped. There is no one who does not attend school at the age of 11 years and below or between 13 and 15 years.

2 of the 19 children and youths are college graduates who just finished their studies, both female and unemployed, at the age of 21 and 22 respectively. These 2 will be excluded in the following data in this section considering the objective of utilizing the data for analysis.

**Table 3-5-2 Education Level and Number of Graduates/Dropouts**

education level	graduates	dropouts
primary	0	1
secondary	4	12
<i>lower secondary</i>	1	4
<i>upper secondary</i>	3	7
<i>unknown</i>	0	1

**Table 3-5-3 Reason for Dropout**




The 17 children, excluding the 2 college graduates, include 4 secondary school graduates and 13 dropouts (Table 3-5-2). One among the 4 secondary school graduates and 2 among the 13 dropouts respond they want to continue their studies. With regard to the 13 dropouts, main reasons for dropout include failure in exams (3 persons); no willingness for continuation of studies (3); difficulties in learning (2); and detention in prison (2) (3 non-responses).

**Table 3-5-4 Profession of Children after Education**


	graduates	dropouts
<b>blue-collar worker</b>	1	7
<b>white-collar worker</b>	0	0
<b>service worker</b>	1	0
<b>non-response</b>	2	6

Almost all the 17 children and youths who finished or stopped their primary or secondary education studies, except for 8 non-responses, are blue-collar workers. As an exceptional case, there is one 17-year-old male who works in the service sector.

**Table 3-5-5 Concern about Children's Life after Education**



**Table 3-5-6 Specific Concern about Children's Life after Education**



One fourth of the 172 households respond they are concerned about their children's life after education whereas 18 households (10%) seem to be more optimistic (111 non-responses). The main concerns of the 43 households with their children's life after receiving education are a lack of job opportunities due to the economic conditions in Palestine (36 responses) and financial difficulties of the household (5). Other types of concerns include unstable social situation in Palestine (1); their child(ren)'s having a handicap or disability (1) or being in prison (1).

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In summary, based on these statistics, among the 502 children and youths between 6 and 22 years of age in the 172 households, 19 (4%) do not attend school, although the percentage seems not so high. The 19 children and youths include 14 males and 5 females, including 2 female new college graduates. The imbalance of the gender ratio can result in the fact that the responses or the statistics obtained in this survey may not reflect or count some young females who have left their parents' household or who joined her husband's family's household after marriage at an relatively early age, which is said to be commonly observed in Palestinian society. However, additional data will be needed for further analysis on this matter.

Moreover, it can be said that employment opportunities seem to be rather limited for those who finished only or stopped their primary or secondary education studies, considering the types of profession that have been available for them. However, more number of samples will be needed for further analysis.

From the statistical data, only one fourth of the 172 households are concerned about their children's life after finishing education, however it does not mean that the rest of the households

are all optimistic because about 65 percent are non-responses to this question for some unknown reason. The main concerns of the 43 households are related to economic conditions in Palestine, such as a lack of job opportunities and financial difficulties of the household (41 responses altogether).

### **3.6 Issues for Attention**

The number of non-responses was larger for some specific questions, such as regarding influence on children by the existence of checkpoints and investigations by the Israeli authority (63 non-responses), and concern about children's life after education (111), perhaps due to their political or socio-cultural connotation. On the contrary, the number of non-responses was almost none for less controversial questions including regarding the availability of utilities (only one non-response), financial support from abroad (3), and ownership of property (2).

Some tendencies are observed in the findings described above, however generalizations on households in the target areas should be avoided, and are not an objective of this research. It should be paid attention to the fact that there exist families that are not "typical" in reality, and diversity should always be considered in an attempt to understand human society. This point will be reflected in interpreting statistical data obtained through this survey in the following chapter.

Through the analysis of the results, some inferences were drawn and questions were newly raised. However, additional data will be needed further for judging those inferences and deepening the analysis from wider perspectives.

## **Chapter 4 Interpretation of Statistical Data from the Survey**

### **4.1 Summary of Main Findings**

The main findings from this survey are summarized as follows.

#### **(1) Characteristics of the Typical Household**

- The typical household with at least one member aged 22 and below in the target areas is Muslim, originated from its village, keeping its residence for more than 20 years, composed of 6.3 family members including 2 adults, and 4.3 children and youths of whom 2.8 persons are between 6 and 22 years of age. They usually live in an owned house composed of 2.6 bedrooms and 1.6 bathrooms, equipped with both water and electricity.
- The main breadwinner of the typical household is father, and his typical profession is blue-collar work. The typical household usually earns an amount between 1,500 and 4,000 NIS/month in average, and does not receive any financial support from any family member living abroad.
- Many in the target households do not have any family member who has regular access to Jerusalem, which seems to highly affect the living standards of households because those with access generally earn a higher income than those without access to Jerusalem.
- A typical household in Al-Azaria earns more and that in Al-Sawahra earns less income among the three target villages.

#### **(2) Education Environment surrounding Children**

- Most children and youth between 6 and 22 years of age in the target households attend school, and most of them are at the primary and secondary levels. The majority of them go to public school.
- Many of those attending school are satisfied with their school, and the majority of the parents and guardians are satisfied with the education provided and consider teaching methods in school as appropriate.
- The majority of the parents and guardians are concerned with their children's educational environment, however very few of them have consulted other people about those concerns. Opinions are divided among them regarding whether the surrounding environment supports their children's education or not.

#### **(3) Children's Daily Life and Education**

- Children in the target households are generally studying and behaving well at school, although some of them have failed classes in school, or had behavioral problems in school.
- Most children spend their time studying outside school and usually supported by their mother at home, but the number of hours per week they spend for their studies varies from less than 6 hours to more than 30 hours per week in average.
- Half of the children participate in extracurricular activities either at or outside school, whereas another half of them do not participate in such activities at all.

#### **(4) Influences from Socio-Political Conditions on Children**

- At least one-third of the target households recognize some negative influences on children caused by the existence of checkpoints and investigations by the Israeli authority – as a matter of fact, they realize those negative influences are on the entire household.

#### **(5) Children's Life after Education**

- A small percentage of children and youths between 6 and 22 years of age in the target households do not attend school, many of whom are males. The imbalance of the gender ratio may result in early marriage of females in Palestinian society.
- Many of those who do not attend school are already employed, but employment opportunities seem to be rather limited for those who have just finished or stopped their primary or secondary education studies.
- At least one fourth of the target households are concerned about their children's life after finishing education. The main concerns are related to economic conditions in Palestine.

#### **4.2 Peculiarities Unique to the Target Areas**

Among these findings, some peculiarities unique to the target areas deserve to be highlighted. One example is impacts on household economy in three villages attributed to the constraints to access Jerusalem. As observed in the statistical data, households whose members have access to Jerusalem obviously earn higher average incomes than those without access. As mentioned in Chapter 1, these three villages are located on the eastern outskirts of Jerusalem, within a distance of approximately two kilometers only from the Old City. However, the separation wall has been built just between the villages and Jerusalem since 2003.

Surprisingly, Al-Sawahra, the Bedouin community of Jerusalem, has actually been divided into two areas by the wall – Al-Sawahra Al-Sharqiya, one of the target areas in this survey for its location on the same side as Al-Azaria and Abu Dis, is east side whereas Al-Sawahra Al-

Gharbiya is west side. Furthermore, Al-Azaria, which has been known for its Christian community, has been affected to a great extent. According to some locals, there was a relatively large movement of Christians from the village to East Jerusalem, the opposite side of the wall, since the beginning of the construction of the wall until when it was finally completed<sup>111</sup>.

After the complete seal of these target villages by the separation wall, people's access to economic and social services were highly diminished since the center of people's lives was in Jerusalem. It can be said that negative influences on people's life in terms of economy derived from socio-political conditions in target areas are testified by a set of statistical data as a case.

Another example of the peculiarities unique to the target areas observed in the findings is some negative impacts on people's daily life, caused by the existence of checkpoints and investigations by the Israeli authority. These negative influences on a daily life basis include financial, psychological and procedural burdens incurred by traveling through checkpoints, restrictions for movement, delay in traveling or commute, etc.

Especially, influences on children and youths in such environments in the target areas cannot be neglected. As observed in the findings, negative psychological influences on children including fear, anxiety, annoyance, depression, aggressiveness and loss of concentration are pointed out.

The limitation in employment opportunities is obviously a critical issue in the target areas, not only for breadwinners of the households, but also for children and youths who stopped or finished their studies, considering the types of profession available for the survey targets. According to some recent statistics<sup>112</sup>, the unemployment rate of those aged 15 years and over is 13.2 percent in the Jerusalem Governorate in 2011. As a matter of fact, the rates are generally much higher among younger generations – 24.3 percent among those between 20 and 24 years of age and 14.9 percent among those between 25 and 29 years of age, whereas much lower among those above 30 years of age and older generations. Based on the observations in the findings, it is inferred that the existence of the separation wall is a large contributing factor to the unemployment issue for the young generations including college graduates in the target areas.

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<sup>111</sup> There seem to be many possible factors involved in explaining the situation – the main reason for the efflux seems to be their fear of losing access to Jerusalem. Although, according to some locals, some cases have been reported in which people originally from the target areas register their official residence with an address in East Jerusalem in order not to lose their access to Jerusalem but actually live in their villages on the opposite side of the wall where daily life is generally less costly compared to East Jerusalem. This is a very sensitive issue, and additional data will be needed for further analysis on this issue.

<sup>112</sup> PCBS, *Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook 2012* ([http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/\\_PCBS/Downloads/book1891.pdf](http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_PCBS/Downloads/book1891.pdf)).

### **4.3 Future Projection of Target Villages**

The education system has been sorely tested during the two Intifadas – facilities were damaged, and students, teachers and the administrative staff suffered from restricted movement under closures and curfews which have likewise made the movement of text books and school supplies difficult. The three villages were also severely affected, although adequate educational services including public schools administered by MoEHE, UNRWA schools, and private schools were recovered in political stability after the end of the second Intifada.

As mentioned earlier, the major obstacle observed in the three villages is the isolation of communities resulting from reductions of access and mobility for residents into Jerusalem caused by the separation wall. The three villages are considered very isolated, also being very far from other major cities such as Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jericho, etc., and social infrastructure is still inadequate, compounded by the fact that there are only a limited number of service providers in target villages, compared to other areas of the West Bank.

Therefore, available educational services are still minimal and constrained to the designated curricula, and other extra-curricular activities are hardly provided, although an extra strain is being put on schools due to the reverse movement from Jerusalem to these neighboring villages because of relatively affordable costs of living compared to Jerusalem.

The locals including young populations are very stressed and feeling oppressed in this unique environment of isolation, although there is not enough space or opportunity for recreation, cultural or recreational activities for students, and psycho-social services are absent in schools in target villages. This situation could easily lead to an erosion of educational enrollments and attainment, and thus an increase in the dropout rates among young generations. Another important contributing factor is, as frequently heard, that young males leave school early in order to support their families, and young females leave school early because of arranged marriages at an early age in target villages.

A special attention should also be paid to the fact that the number of population is drastically increasing in these areas. This should parallel with an increase in the spending in social services and also educational services. This situation will, in turn, affect the quality of education in target villages very soon.

Under the circumstances where the budget for formal education provided by MoEHE is constrained and the number of service providers in the education sector in three villages is limited, other actors could play important roles for the improvement of quality of education and the development of the sector in target areas.

One of them is the local council, a legal and financially independent body<sup>113</sup>, of each village. Although they do not have actual powers in the field of education<sup>114</sup>, they might be able to facilitate investment in infrastructure for education or strengthen transportation control and management to improve the educational environment in target villages. The latter is especially important for the development of higher education, considering the fact that these areas are the only passage between the center and the south of the West Bank.

As another important actor and definitely an education leader in the region, Al-Quds University located in Abu Dis should play major roles in enhancing the quality of education and concentration of education services in neighboring areas. However, as observed in the survey results, not many households benefit from its services, other than degree courses. In fact, it is pointed out that the university's main focus has been more on East Jerusalem, and obviously not enough yet on the areas including Abu Dis itself. The university should probably provide more added value to services in the education sector in three villages. Also, education related issues should be actively and openly discussed at different levels by various stakeholders, such as the local councils, civil society including both local and international ones, and the general public themselves, so that strategic partnerships could emerge and an enhancement in education services would take place eventually.

#### **4.4 Strategies for Further Benefiting Needy Children and Youths in Three Villages**

Taking into account the poor educational services available and difficult employment situation among young generations in the three villages, it is considered meaningful to a great deal to provide services in non-formal education as extra-curricular activities as well as vocational training in the target areas. It should be noted, as described in the explanation of Table 3-4-21, that about 30 percent of the children who participate in extracurricular activities outside school took part in activities conducted at KnK's youth center in Azaria at the time of the survey. Also, it can be said that services provided at the center match children's preferences and needs, as most activities shown in Table 3-4-22 (popular extracurricular activities) and Table 3-4-16 (subjects failed) are all implemented at the center.

It is, however, indispensable to provide services that continue to match children's needs in order to expand the beneficiaries in the target areas. Also, it is incumbent to review strategies on a regular basis in a flexible manner in terms of selecting main targets for the project based on

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<sup>113</sup> The local councils in Palestine, formulated by relevant laws, assume important tasks such as provision of basic infrastructure services and other public services, planning and zoning in economic development, and administrative and regulatory functions (Youth Shadow Local Councils (YSLC), "*Local Governance in Palestine*," Retrieved on Dec. 3, 2012 from URL: <<http://yslc.ps/etemplate.php?id=176>>). For more details, see YSLC's site.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*

children's real needs. For example, it turned out, as shown in Table 3-3-8, that households in Al-Sawahra are poorer than the other two villages, namely Al-Azaria and Abu Dis, which actually was already presumed before conducting the surveys. Therefore, it may be necessary to make greater efforts in further expanding beneficiaries and benefiting needy children in Al-Sawahra through KnK's project activities.

Reviewing strategies in selecting beneficiaries for vocational training at the center is also needed. As of December 2012, most of the participants in computer skills courses are students at Al-Quds University, and many of the participants in secretary skills courses are female students at the University as well as young mothers who bring their children to the center. In the meantime, based on the findings of the survey results as shown in Table 3-5-4, employment opportunities in the target areas seem to be even more limited for those who finished or stopped their education at an early stage. Thus, it may be effective and desirable to also target those needy youths for vocational training at the center.

In addition, it can be said that building a close relationship with Al-Quds University as an education leader in the region is beneficial for the project, as proven by implementing this survey. Further development in such a relationship should continue for the sake of the project's beneficiaries. Also, it is highly expected that feedback on findings from the survey results will contribute to further connecting the university and target villages in the future.

To better understand the needs of children and youths in the target areas, it may be useful to carry out additional surveys in three villages, such as differences in the quality of education services depending on the type of school – i.e. public, private and UNRWA schools. Also, a comparison study of the living and educational environments of children and youths between the three villages and East Jerusalem may be effective to further analyze the impacts of the separation wall on children's daily life in three villages.